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ARTICLES
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
MICHAEL D. BIRNHACKt
INTRODUCTION
Copyright law is the main legal space that addresses one of the
most distinct features of humankind: knowledge.' It attempts to regu-
late some aspects of what is usually referred to as the creative process,
but it does not limit its view to the initial point of the process. It aims
at the more lofty goal of human knowledge. This paper is an endeavor
in intellectual history. I will explore an idea, strangely understudied,
that guides much of our thought about copyright. Exposing this idea is
especially important today, when copyright law is at a crucial cross-
roads and has already been declared dead by some observers. 2
Strictly anecdotal surveys reveal that even many copyright law-
yers don't remember all of the Constitution's copyright clause. Here it
is:
The Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. 3
The phrase they usually forget is "the Progress of." This paper sheds
light on the idea of progress and its central place in copyright law. The
idea of progress is the belief that humankind is on an inevitable course
of betterment, and that knowledge is a product of an ongoing cumula-
tive effort which is secular in nature.
t Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, Israel. I wish to thank
Yochai Benkler, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, and the participants of the JSD Colloquium
at NYU School of Law for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Fania Oz-Salzberger for
sharing her enlightening comments.
1 Neil Postman defined knowledge as "organized information - information that is
embedded in some context; information that has a purpose, that leads one to seek further
information in order to understand something about the world." See generally NEIL POST-
MAN, BUILDING A BRIDGE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 93 (1999).
2 See generally Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millen-
nium, 47 J. COPR. Soc'Y 193 (2000).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Today the idea is so obvious that it is hardly noticed, and its rela-
tion to copyright law has been almost entirely overlooked. 4 The argu-
ment I will make here is simple: The knowledge process, which is at
the core of copyright law, is best understood through the idea of pro-
gress. This is a normative argument, and thus has important implica-
tions for contemporary analysis and application of copyright law.
Explaining the central place of the idea of progress in copyright
law is an attempt to unearth the hidden assumptions that the law
holds as to the knowledge process. Once we accept that copyright law
addresses the knowledge process (and this does not require that we
abandon other subject matters of copyright law, not even Paul Gold-
stein's claim that "[m]ostly, though, copyright is about money"5), it
immediately follows that the law must reflect (and at the same time
construct) an understanding of knowledge. I will try to detect this
view. A successful attempt should pass a double test: it should be able
to explain the way in which copyright law operates (a descriptive test),
and it should be normatively appealing (a prescriptive test). We can
rephrase these demands in Dworkinian terms as "fit" and "justifica-
4 There are a few exceptions: one is the historical project of ROBERT NISBET, THE
HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 203 (1994, 1998). Nisbet, however, only mentions the
copyright clause as an example of the close relationship of knowledge and progress. An-
other exception is a short reference to the copyright clause made by Robert Goldwin, who
explains it on the background of the framers' economic philosophy, and aptly proposes
that the clause be called "the progress clause." See ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, WHY BLACKS,
WOMEN, AND JEWS ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER UNORTHO-
DOX VIEWS 41 (1990). A third exception is an important article by Margaret Chon,
Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power 43 DEPAUL L.
REV. 97 (1993). As the title of her article indicates, Chon juxtaposes a traditional ("mod-
ern") notion of progress with a postmodern one. Here, I concentrate on what Chon names
"modern" progress: the original meaning of the idea as it is fixed in the Constitution.
Chon's critique of the modernist "progress" is aimed at its linearity and at its incapacity to
recognize the "global village" phenomenon. She is interested in distribution of fairness and
decentralization of control over knowledge (id. at 101-102, 133), and articulates a right to
access. However, postmodernism does not have a monopoly over the latter concerns. In
fact, these concerns have brought others, not necessarily writing within a postmodernist
paradigm, to the same conclusion (see for example Patterson and Lindberg, infra note 15).
Furthermore, Chon herself links the postmodernist view of progress to the Enlightenment,
and bases her case for the right to access on Madison and Jefferson, id. at 134-144 (con-
cluding that "[a] modern 'Progress' read in light of both Madison's and Jefferson's views on
intellectual property requires not just that incentives be provided to authors and inventors
to increase knowledge, but that each human being have the right to use that knowledge").
Chon tries to distance herself from the modernist view by claiming that "[p]ostmodern
'Progress' is also premised on knowledge but seeks a different relationship to it," id. at 144.
By a "different relationship" she means indeterminacy or contingency. In this paper I en-
gage in a modernist analysis. However, the concerns here are similar to Chon's, though I
think they are traditional concerns just as much as they are postmodernist.
5 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 7 (1994).
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tion," which are two cumulative requirements of interpretation. 6 The
idea of progress, I shall argue, passes both these tests.
There have been other attempts to explain copyright's conception
of the knowledge process, even though they were not articulated as
such. An important project discussed the place of the author in copy-
right law: this is the notion of the singular, romantic author, who
works in a deteriorated physical environment but enjoys spiritual in-
spiration. The romantic author bears a unique relationship to his or
her work, which is often described in terms of embodiment of person-
ality and in metaphors of parenthood.7 That project showed that the
notion of the author is a social construction,8 explained how it came
into being,9 and showed its place in copyright law. 10 It is said to be
quite a central place, and indeed it explains a few copyright doctrines
and the attitude of some courts. It also provides a convenient point of
comparison between copyright in this land and across the ocean. 1
Subsequent participants in the authorship project showed its negative
effects. 12 The more the notion of the romantic author occupies our
mind, the less it is capable of capturing other forms of creation: collab-
orative authorship (the movie industry, scientific research, tribal folk-
lore), authorship which is the product of hard work (creating data
bases), works created in well-funded plants (the pharmaceutical indus-
try), and commercial works that lack inspiration (like most
phonebooks). The notion of the romantic author also tips our view of
copyright law towards a proprietary conception thereof-namely, that
copyright is a natural right that is best explained either on the back-
6 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228, 230-231 (1985).
7 See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L.
REV. 503 (1945) ("The man who brings out of nothingness, some child of his thought, has
rights therein which cannot belong to any other sort of property."). For discussion, see
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993) at 38-39
(paternity metaphor) and at 114 (personality).
8 Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Condi-
tions of the Emergence of the Author, 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUDIES 425 (1984); Carla
Hesse, Enlightenment Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France,
1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 109 (1990).
9 See THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 191 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1993); Rose, supra note 7.
10 Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of "Authorship,"
1991 DUKE L. J. 455.
11 See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TULANE L. REV. 991 (1990), reprinted in OF AUTHORS AND ORI-
GINS (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994).
12 See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
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ground of Lockean labor theory13 or on the background of per-
sonhood theories.' 4 The concept of authorship does explain a large
portion of copyright law as it is applied, but it does not explain all
doctrines (joint authorship, work for hire, and fair use, for example),
and its drawbacks-the exclusion of other forms of creation-are too
numerous to allow this notion to be a prescription.
There has been another attempt to explain the concept copyright
law holds of the knowledge process: that its core element is not the
author, but the user. This was mainly the project of Professors L. Ray
Patterson and Stanley Lindberg.15 In their view, copyright law is im-
portant for what it omits. While the law addresses the rights of authors
and other owners, its residuary is the most important site: the users.16
Patterson and Lindberg find an implied right of access, 17 deduce a
personal use principle, and articulate a fair use principle. 18 This at-
tempt, while normatively appealing, often fails the descriptive role of
a successful theory. Patterson and Lindberg show again and again how
users' rights were narrowed as the authors' rights expanded. They
complain about a transformation from a regulatory view of copyright
law to a proprietary one,' 9 about the role false fictions play in devel-
oping the law,20 and about the failure of various doctrines, such as fair
use.
21
The idea of progress has the capacity to be both descriptive and
prescriptive. It can explain much of copyright law's doctrines (the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use are examples I will discuss
later on), it fits the "economic philosophy" of the Supreme Court and
other official functions as to copyright law,2 2 and it is compatible with
the economic analysis of this field.2 3 It can explain historical changes
and especially the politicization of copyright law-that is, how copy-
right came to embody a political principle. It can also serve as a pre-
13 See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT - THE SECOND TREATISE 1690
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988), and discussion in JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1988).
14 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
15 L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS (1991).
16 See id. at 5.
17 See id. at 52.
18 See id. at 69 (private use); at 66 (fair use).
19 See id. at 77, 88.
20 See id. at 134.
21 See id. at 103.
22 For the "economic philosophy," see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). The
legislature has repeatedly explained copyright law on a utilitarian basis. See for example
HR Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 3d Sess.
23 See William M. Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989).
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scription: it is more flexible and dynamic than the authorship project,
it does not exclude non-romantic forms of creation and, finally, it cap-
tures the regulatory conception of copyright law rather than the pro-
prietary conception. In its normative affiliation, the idea of progress
captures the prescriptive claims of Patterson and Lindberg's rights-of-
users project, but bases them on more solid grounds.
This paper, in section I below, begins with an introduction of the
idea of progress in itself: its main features and subject matters, its rela-
tionship to other intellectual movements in history, and the place it
occupied in the eighteenth century. Section II then turns to show how
the idea was injected into American copyright law at the end of the
eighteenth century. This is a historical argument. I will outline the his-
tory of copyright law up to that point and show that its English source
is best explained as a form of trade regulation. We will then cross the
ocean, to study the introduction of copyright law into the American
legal system. This is a snapshot of the idea of progress at the time of
the formation of the Constitution. We will see that this introduction
shifted the nature of copyright law into a political idea. Section III
takes another snapshot, this time of contemporary copyright law. It is
meant to establish that the idea of progress is pervasive in our thought
about copyright law, though it is not recognized as such.
The task of this paper is quite ambitious. There is much more
work that can be done in this project. My goal here is to offer an
alternative way of thinking in copyright law, or more accurately, to
expose an explanation that, I argue, is already quite pervasive in our
thought.
I.
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
Progress was a buzzword in the eighteenth century,24 and its
strong relationship to the Enlightenment explains this timing. It is
hardly a buzzword today, and the quiet disappearance of the idea has
caused not only students of copyright law to ignore its original mean-
ing and role, but also students of the Constitution.25 Professor Robert
Nisbet traces the first use of the word progress to a time as early as the
Roman poet Titus Lucretius (99-55 BC) in the expression pedetemtim
progredientes, meaning step by step.2 6 The view that the origin of pro-
24 For a similar observation, see CARL BECKER, PROGRESS AND POWER 3-4 (New York,
1949).
25 One important exception is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (New York, 1978). Bickel analyzed the activism of the Warren
Court through the lens of progress.
26 Nisbet, supra note 4, at xii, 42.
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gress is to be found in the classics is controversial. 27 The majority of
scholars hold that it is a modern idea of the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries.28 For our task here, I need not outline the history of
the idea, but rather present it as it was understood in the eighteenth
century. What follows is thus not a chronological discussion.
So what is the idea of progress? Consider Professor Nisbet's defi-
nition, following St. Augustine:
[tihe vision of an unfolding cumulative advancement of the human
race in time-a unified, single human race, be it emphasized-a sin-
gle time frame for all the peoples and epochs of the past and pre-
sent, the conception of time as a linear, single flow, the use of
evolving stages and epochs in the history of humanity, belief in the
necessary, as well as sacred character of mankind's history as set
forth in the Old Testament, and finally, the envisagement of a fu-
ture, distinctly utopian end of history when the saved would go to
eternal heaven.29
Or consider a secular definition, that of David Spadafora: "[t]he belief
in the movement over time of some aspect or aspects of human exis-
tence, within a social setting, towards a better condition. 30.
These definitions contain almost all the central features of the
idea. The idea has a few dimensions: one is its structure, a term that
addresses the idea's view of time, direction, and goal. Another dimen-
sion is that of the players. The idea of progress celebrates human be-
ings rather than an external entity. Nisbet's definition is based on St.
Augustine, and is inherently religious. Interestingly, the players are
not conceived as individuals, but as parts of a collective, which is the
entire humankind. Yet another dimension of the idea is the content of
the idea. Nisbet's definition, quoted above, addresses the progress of
history, but there are other subject matters of the idea, like morality,
science, technology, and knowledge.
27 The strongest argument for this view is Nisbet, id. passim. See also LUDWIG EDEL-
STEIN, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY (Baltimore, 1967). For a moder-
ate view, see MARGARITA MATHIOPOULOS, HISTORY AND PROGRESS - IN SEARCH OF THE
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN MIND 7-1i (New York, 1989).
28 The most notable example is the classical work of JOHN BAGNELL BURY, THE IDEA
OF PROGRESS: AN INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH 7 (New York, 1932). Daniel
Boorstin identifies the first "progressive" statement in modern times to be that of the
French philosopher Marquis de-Condorect in his Sketch of a Historical Picture of the Pro-
gress of Human Mind, published in 1795. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE SEEKERS: THE STORY
OF MAN'S CONTINUING QUEST TO UNDERSTAND HIS WORLD 184 (New York, 1998). Later
on I shall argue that earlier modern statements can be found in the American context.
29 Nisbet, supra note 4, at xiii.
30 DAVID SPADAFORA, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN 6
(New Haven, 1990). Margarita Mathiopoulos deliberately refrains from a definition. See
supra note 27, at 2.
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I shall now examine the various elements of progress.
A. The Structure of the Idea of Progress
1. Time
One of the most obvious elements of the idea of progress is that it
is a theory of change over time. The temporal dimension is crucial for
the understanding of the idea. Saying that changes occur over time
seems self-evident to us today, but it has not always been obvious. The
idea of progress emphasizes the temporal dimension by recognizing a
gradual development. Thus, Professor Bury noted: "The idea of
human Progress then is a theory which involves a synthesis of the past
and a prophecy of the future. ' 31 Two notes are to be made in regard to
this element.32
One is that it rejects other views of time. It rejects an idea that
civilization is static and is not moving anywhere in particular. The
temporal dimension is also tied to the notion of irreversible time.33
Most importantly, this feature distinguishes progress from primitivism
and from a cyclical view. The former is the aspiration to restore things
to their oldest known mode, following the belief that the past was bet-
ter in some sense. Such a view is usually connected to ethics and mo-
rality. The doctrine of original sin is an example of the aspiration to
restore an old order that is considered to be superior to the present.
Cyclical theories deny the linear advancement of civilization.
Rather, they describe it as moving in cycles, in the form of "rise and
fall." Thus, good times will be followed by bad times.34 The cyclical
theory has yet another implication that distinguishes it from the idea
of progress: it is descriptive in nature, rather than prescriptive. It is a
pessimistic view.
A second note to be made is that progress is not just a historical
account of the past, but it is also, again in Bury's words, a "philosophy
of action. ' 35 In other words, it is not only a descriptive account, but a
31 Bury, supra note 28, at 5.
32 The temporal element can be understood in a religious context, as St. Augustine
understood it. See Nisbet, supra note 4, at 62. I do not discuss the religious reading of the
temporal dimension, since, as will be discussed shortly, progress drifted away from the
religious emphasis, though it did not entirely depart from it.
33 Nisbet, id. at 63
34 See also Nisbet, id. at 63, 103-104; Spadafora, supra note 30, at 14, and Edelstein,
supra note 27, at 46 (tracing the origins of the cyclical theory to Pythagoreans of the fifth
century BC); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 85 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) (reporting that the cyclical theory was held by many in
the colonies).
35 Bury, supra note 28, at xl. See also ARTHUR ALPHONSE EKIRCH, THE IDEA OF PRO-
GRESS IN AMERICA, 1815-1860 11 (New York, 1944).
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prescription for behavior in the future. The philosophy of action de-
rives its content from the past. This is not to say that the past serves as
the sole instructor to the present and a philosophy for the future. This
would be the antithesis of progress, because it would eliminate the
next dimension we discuss, that of change. The past serves as gui-
dance, a first crossroads in a philosophical inquiry, remote from its
final destination.
The temporal dimension removes progress from the exclusive
realm of historians. It becomes relevant to civilization at large and
acquires practical meanings. We can think of many fields that are can-
didates for the subject matter of the idea. In fact, any field of human
activity that we can plausibly think of as having a history, even if it is a
week-old field, can be the subject matter of progress. Lawyers are fa-
miliar with one such field: law itself. This should be no surprise. As a
matter of fact, this temporal dimension of progress is particularly fa-
miliar to jurists who practice within a common law system. The tem-
poral dimension, with its implicit elements (that things change, that
there is a development, and that the future is determined, in part, on
the basis of the past), is how courts make law. The idea of progress fits
the legal common law practice perfectly. It both describes the prac-
tice, and commands a prescription for the future: it is a prescription in
which the past is given significant weight in the process of determining
the future. The prescriptive element is demonstrated in Professor
Ronald Dworkin's theory of interpretation and adjudication. The met-
aphor of law as a chain novel embodies both elements of the temporal
dimension of progress: "[E]ach novelist in the chain interprets the
chapters he has been given in order to write a new chapter, which is
then added to what the next novelist receives, and so on."'36
2. Direction
The prescriptive feature of progress, understood as a reliance on
civilization's change over time, is not indifferent to the direction of the
change. The idea of progress holds a strong belief that the direction is
towards betterment. This is how we use progress in daily language.
Bury writes that "[t]he idea means that civilization has moved, is mov-
ing and will move in a desirable direction. '37 Or in the words of an-
other scholar: "The word progress has positive, optimistic
connotations. It conveys the notion of advancement to higher accom-
plishments, towards an attainable utopia, a world of infinite diversity
36 DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 228-232.
37 Bury, supra note 28, at 2.
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and yet stable despite its complexity, a world developing a path of
deterministic development. '38
A statement that things will improve in the future can be under-
stood in one of two ways.39 One is that it merely reflects a belief based
on an optimistic view of human nature, or even just a hope. This kind
of belief, in its extreme, does not allocate any role for mankind. We
are to observe passively the changing world. Another way to under-
stand the statement that things will improve is that it is a prescription.
In this sense, the clear direction of progress is not merely a belief. It
dictates an active role for humankind. It is guidance for action. Here,
too, the idea of progress should be familiar to common law lawyers.
Law aims at solving conflicts. We keep amending the law, so as to
improve it. Oliver Wendell Holmes aimed, in his Common Law, at an
ideal state to which law progresses. 40 The Constitution aims "to form a
more perfect union."
Does this forward-looking direction mean that there is an end to
the change, an ultimate end to be achieved? The idea of progress, at
least in its Anglo-American understanding, defies such a view. Pro-
gress is endless. It has a purpose, and in this sense is teleological, but
the purpose is not a fixed one. It keeps changing-and the change is
one of advancement. The idea of progress claims that there is always a
place for improvement. 41
B. . The Human Role
So far we have seen that the idea of progress is that civilization
advances toward a better situation in the course of time. Another fea-
ture of the idea finds its origin in Christianity: civilization is on a route
38 Antonio Gracia-Bellido, Progress in Biological Evolution in THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
175 (Arnold Burgen ed.). See also George Henrick von Wright, Progress: Fact and Fiction,
in THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, id. at 1 ("Progress is a change for the better.").
39 John Baillie aptly pointed to a similar distinction, between "observed progress,"
which he connected to technical progress, and "belief in progress," which he classified as
spiritual. See JOHN BAILLIE, THE BELIEF IN PROGRESS 156 (London, 1950).
40 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 53-54 (New Haven, 1977).
41 Some political thinkers and historians held otherwise. Karl Marx argued that human-
kind progresses over time, that change is for the better, and that there is an ultimate goal
to be achieved. More recently, Francis Fukuyama could announce no less than the end of
history, in his THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). He did not mean, despite
the provocative title, that from then on nothing would happen anymore. It was not an
apocalyptic view; on the contrary, Fukuyama argues that history has an end. Finding au-
thority for the latter view in both G.W.F. Hegel and Marx, despite their different views of
what that end is, Fukuyama argued that there is today a remarkable consensus about the
legitimacy of liberal democracy, and that this is "the final form of human government" (at
64-65). This is an exceptionally provocative view, and I think the nervousness many people
felt in reaction was due to the claim that the goal of humankind is fixed, that there is an
end to betterment.
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of progress as part of God's design.42 This was the contribution of the
Christian philosophers to the idea of progress. 43 Divine will dictates a
necessary progress. Accordingly, as St. Augustine argued in the fifth
century, the ultimate goal towards which humankind constantly pro-
gresses is to achieve the "City of God," 44 to fulfill the millennial hope.
The City of God was in another life, and the Earthly City could never
be as spiritual.
The immediate implication of holding a religious view of progress
is that it leaves a relatively minor role for human beings. If everything
that happened and will happen is part of God's unfolding plan, man
has a rather passive role.45 We could follow religious commandments,
such as the Calvinist ethic of work, and improve our stakes in the
world, but the general instruction as to progress is that this is beyond
man's reach. If so, progress cannot be promoted, to use the constitu-
tional language.
But as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries unfolded, the
idea of progress abandoned the extreme religious view.46 This process
should be understood against the background of the Enlightenment
both in its European origin and its American form.47 The roots are
found earlier, in the Renaissance, with its placement of Man in the
center. Reason replaced God.48 The teleological character of progress,
its continuous evolution toward the better, and its goal to reach
perfection were not given up in the process of secularization. The City
of God was transformed and reformulated as the achievement of a
better civilization for men. Some scholars explain this process as "the
offspring of a union of the millennial hope with the moralism of the
42 Rutherford E. Delmage, The American Idea of Progress, 1750-1800, 91 PROCEED-
INGS OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 307 (1947).
43 Nisbet, supra note 4, chapter 2.
44 This is the name of Augustine's book, as well as Carl Becker's study. See generally
CARL L. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS
(1932). See also WALLACE K. FERGUSON, THE RENAISSANCE IN HISTORICAL
THOUGHT-FIVE CENTURIES OF INTERPRETATION 84 (1948).
45 See Postman, supra note 1, at 26-27.
46 Nisbet, supra note 4, at 69; Ferguson, supra note 44, at 83-84; Delmage, supra note
42, at 308-309; Becker, supra note 24, at 48, 129. This process was enabled by another
transformation: that of Puritanism into a more optimistic view. See infra note 79.
47 For a comprehensive discussion of the American form of Enlightenment, see HENRY
FARNHAM MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1965); BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS, supra note 34, at 26- 27.
48 Reason - and progress - were not accepted without criticism; the most famous was
that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For an argument about the complex relationship between
progress and rationality see LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS: TOWARD A
THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC GROWTH 6 (1977).
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cyclical view of history. ' 49 God, however, remained only in a secon-
dary role.
The main effect of the process of secularization was a redefinition
of man's role in the world. If, there is progress, as the abandonment of
the cyclical theory implies, and it is not understood anymore as dic-
tated by God's plan, then it must be someone else, or something else,
that motivates the change. There must be an engine that supplies
power to civilization and enables its progress. 50
One suggestion was to identify the engine of progress as an "in-
visible hand." This, of course, is Adam Smith's explanation of eco-
nomic growth. The transformation of one view, that of static, fixed
civilization, into the idea of progress is evident by the comparison of
Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, with the lesser-known
book by Bernard Mandeville, Fable of the Bees-Private Vices, Public
Benefits, first published in 1705. Both proposed that in order to
achieve a common goal, we should aim at the self-interest of individu-
als. But Mandeville did not think of an increase of wealth, whereas
Smith believed that wealth could indeed be increased. 51 Mandeville's
view is not one of progress, Whereas Smith's is.
Another explanation, and one that fits within the invisible hand
theory, points to us, human beings, as the engines of progress. In the
process of secularization, man gained a greater role in achieving pro-
gress. 52 Forrest McDonald finds the origins of this view in John
Locke's epistemological proposition: If man is born tabula rasa, and
achieves whatever is achieved through means of experiences over
time, then humanity too can improve by education and social experi-
ence. 53 This new emphasis on human beings' own control over their
lives was a result of, first, the Renaissance, and then of the Enlighten-
ment, and their celebration of the individual and reason. Once
humans regained control over their fate, the prescriptive element of
progress was born as well: "The aim of the historian en philosophe,
however, was not merely to depict the march of human progress, but
to aid further advance by instructing and enlightening men."54
The individual was reborn, in the sense of detachment from God.
But the individual is still conceived as part of humankind. The idea of
49 Stow Persons, The Cyclical Theory of History in 18'h Century America, 6 AMERICAN
Q. 147, 158 (1954).
50 See BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY, supra note 44, at 129.
51 This point was made by FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM-THE IN-
TELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 126 (1985).
52 Persons, supra note 49, at 163.
53 McDonald, supra note 51, at 53.
54 Ferguson, supra note 44.
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progress is cumulative in nature. The gradual, constant change is
achieved through the common promotion of progress, by human be-
ings, along the course of time. We have seen this element in Nisbet's
definition, cited above: it was "a unified, single human race" that is
the subject of progress.55 The inter-temporal dimension itself suggests
the accumulation of knowledge over time. 56
This view has raised some objections. Consider, for example
Thomas Kuhn's theory of the development of science. Roughly speak-
ing, the structure of scientific changes, according to Kuhn, is a struc-
ture of serial paradigms. Most scientists engage, most of the time, in
"normal science. '57 Their work is paradigm-dependent. 58 They try to
further articulate and explain the paradigm: eliminating ambiguities,
discovering new applications and rendering the paradigm more pre-
cise. 59 This stage is very different from that of introducing a new para-
digm: a new paradigm undermines the old one and changes the whole
way of thinking in the field. If a new paradigm manages to gain recog-
nition, it is a scientific revolution. 60 Kuhn applies "progress" language,
which should be familiar by now, and accuses textbooks of misrepre-
senting scientific revolutions:
[Textbooks create the impression that] science has reached its pre-
sent stage by a series of individual discoveries and inventions that,
when gathered together, constitute the modern body of technical
knowledge .... One by one, in a process often compared to the
addition of bricks to a building, scientists have added another fact,
concept, law, or theory to the body of information supplied in con-
temporary science texts. But that is not the way science develops. 61
Without going into an evaluation of Kuhn's work, we should note that
even his theory leaves room for cumulative advancement within the
paradigms.62
Considering this gradual process of secularization, it is easy to see
how it is possible for human beings "to promote the Progress. ' 63 This
brings us to another feature of progress. The religious belief in God-
directed progress meant that the process is inevitable. I think this fea-
55 See Nisbet, supra note 4, at xiii.
56 Arnold Pacey explains how some authors tried to measure progress, to prove its
cumulative nature. See ARNOLD PACEY, THE CULTURE OF TECHNOLOGY 13 (1996).
57 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 5-6, 23 (3rd ed.,
1996).
58 Id. at 30.
59 Id. at 34.
60 Id. at 6, 90, 92.
61 Id. at 140.
62 For another non-cumulative account of progress, see Laudan, supra note 48, at 147.
63 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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ture is best understood as a supplement to the absence of human in-
fluence over progress. Once humans cannot control the stream of
events, it is a natural conclusion that it is conceived as inevitable. In-
evitability in this sense means inability to affect improvement. But if
human beings are the ones in control, it is not so clear that the pro-
gress is inevitable. The modern idea of progress, the one reformulated
in the Enlightenment, had, however, some difficulties accepting this
notion. Some dominant figures searched for a law of progress, some-
thing that drives it.64 Darwin's evolutionary theory can be described as
an attempt to find the law of progress in biology; Marx's theory of the
social struggle can be described as an attempt to find the law of pro-
gress in history. Today, we may doubt this feature of inevitability,65
especially when we talk about progress in history measured by human
welfare.
C. The Subject Matter of Progress
By now, it should be evident that, in a sense, progress is a general
idea.66 It directs us towards a better condition, but does not define
what is better. Thus, we are given leeway for different conceptions of
the good,67 and are also free to choose the right way to achieve it.
This feature of the idea of progress is revealed in its subject mat-
ter. The feature of change over time implies its relevance to history,
but its prescriptive element indicates a wider range of subject matters.
Nisbet mentions a variety of contents that the idea embraces: "The
idea of progress does indeed point to material, moral, and spiritual
advancement .... 68 He identifies one subject matter of progress to be
knowledge, and a second major proposition to be "man's moral or
spiritual condition on earth, his happiness, his freedom from torments
of nature and society, and above all his serenity or tranquility. '69 I
shall leave aside the spiritual content of progress. Whether or not we
are persuaded by it, and as far as it does not overlap knowledge, it is
clear that the means to promote spiritual progress is not primarily le-
64 See Nisbet, supra note 4, at xv.
65 See Gilmore, supra note 40, at 104 ("The one thing that is clear is that no one, except
speakers on ceremonial occasions, any longer believes the comforting eighteenth-century
myth about the inevitability of progress.").
66 Ekirch defines this feature as rendering progress a vague idea. See Ekirch, supra
note 35, at 7, 37. Spadafora addresses this feature from a more sympathetic view, and
points out that "there is a multitude of possible expressions of the idea," supra note 30, at
7.
67 See Becker, supra note 24, at 5; W. WARREN WAGAR, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
SINCE THE RENAISSANCE 19 (1969).
68 Nisbet, supra note 4, at xiii.
69 Nisbet, id. at 5, 127.
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gal. Other possible subject matters of progress were noted as well.
Among these are "progress in knowledge of the environment of
man, '' 70 in arts, social and political organization, 71 or, as Francis Bacon
named his book, The Advancement of Learning,72 in "the natural sci-
ences," and finally in technology.73 Progress in this naked form is in-
different to the good. In this sense, the idea of progress is not an
independent theory; it does not embrace a grand theory that has a
comprehensive view over its subject matter. Moreover, the adaptabil-
ity of other theories to the idea of progress, and its own inability to be
a singular theory, might explain why it has been underestimated by
many scholars in the past 212 years. It is conceived at best as an ancil-
lary idea. It is not surprising that progress received almost no discus-
sion by lawyers and the attention of only a relatively small group of
historians.
These subject matters can roughly be divided into two main
groups. One relates to changes in politics, in a broad sense, which I
shall refer to as political-intellectual progress. This contains the subject
matter of knowledge, and social and political organization. The other
relates to material changes, e.g., progress in technology and natural
sciences. It is not an intellectual area, but rather an earthy, measura-
ble one. I shall call this group material progress. We can identify a
subgroup, progress in welfare, which is simply the maximization of
welfare, quite a familiar theme to economic analysts of law. This sub-
group fits either of the two kinds of progress. The two groups are the
ones most mentioned by those who held the idea, and by students of
progress.74 The debate over progress is, to a large extent, the tension
between the various kinds of progress. Does material progress imply
or entail political-intellectual progress?
In the next section I argue that the Constitution incorporates
both kinds of progress, but that copyright law is best understood in
terms of intellectual progress, while patent law is best understood in
70 SIDNEY POLLARD, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: HISTORY AND SOCIETY vii (1968); Don
Price identifies two main groups of progress: of society, which is political freedom, and of
science, which is material benefits. See DON K. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE 1 (1965).
71 Nisbet identifies these in Plato's THE LAWS. See Nisbet, supra note 4, at 29.
72 Bacon's book is dated to 1605. It is telling to note the similarity of this title to the
1709 Statute of Anne, often considered the first modern copyright law. See infra note 128.
For a discussion of Bacon's articulation of the idea of progress see Nisbet, id. at 112-115,
and Spadafora, supra note 30, at 8, 21-22. It seems that Bacon was more interested in what
Baillie named "earthy advancement," but this was so because of his belief in science's
larger implications, which are less earthy matters. See Baillie, supra note 39, at 100-103.
73 See Baillie, id. at 156; Price, supra note 70.
74 Ekirch points to this difference as well, though according to his report, the American
version of progress is closer to the material, and the European version is closer to the
political. See Ekirch, supra note 35, at 37.
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terms of material progress. But we first note the influence of the idea
in America.
D. The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century America
In the 1770s, America knew a powerful intellectual turmoil that
culminated in the Revolution and the formation of the Constitution.
Why did the colonies revolt against Britain? Why did they, a decade
later, decide to crown their successful independence with a written
Constitution? Why did they come up with the Constitution as we
know it? The answers to these questions are by no means simple.
There are political, economic, cultural, psychological, religious, and
probably many other explanations. 75 All these constituted a political
context that enabled (or perhaps motivated) the Revolution and later
the formation of the Constitution. Obviously, any attempt to discuss
or even map all the intellectual themes and their relation to each
other is far beyond the scope and needs of this paper. Louis Hartz
aptly described the intellectual background of the late eighteenth cen-
tury in America as an "ideological confusion. '76 I focus on the idea of
progress. This should not be understood as underestimating the sub-
stance, importance, or impact that other ideologies and intellectual
sources might have had. Among these are legal sources, like the com-
mon law77 and natural law;78 religious sources, like New England Puri-
tanism 79 and Hebraism;80 and political sources, like the political
theories of John Locke and David Hume,81 radical English opposi-
75 Bailyn maps four major lines to the interpretation of the Revolution. See BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF.THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3-9 (1967).
76 As well as "ideological smoke," Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN
AMERICA 79, 86 (1955).
77 Blackstone's Commentaries was especially influential. See Hartz, at 47. A variation
of this theme is "a constitutional perspective" of the ideological origins. See JOHN PHILLIP
REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Madison, Wis., 1995).
78 The Declaration of Independence is the main evidence of this theme, though it has
been criticized as irrelevant. See John Phillip Reid, The Irrelevance of the Declaration in
LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 46 (Hendrik
Hartog ed., 1981).
79 See WOODBRIDGE RILEY, AMERICAN THOUGHT FROM PURITANISM TO PRAGMA-
TISM AND BEYOND (1915). Riley characterizes Puritanism as constituted of three elements:
passivity, determination, and pessimism. The notion of Puritanism flourished in the seven-
teenth century, and was replaced in the following century by a deist belief, which was the
complete opposite of Puritanism, and was constituted of activity, freedom, and optimism.
80 Hebraism in the sense of a belief in the idea of being a "chosen people" that carries
out a mission, especially in terms of the "New World" vs. the "Old World." See Hartz,
supra note 76, at 37. Interestingly, Hartz describes the Supreme Court as being the "He-
braic expositor of the American general will." Id. at 208-209.
81 For a discussion of political theories' influence on the founders, see generally
Thomas L. Pangle, The Philosophic Understandings of Human Nature Informing the Con-
stitution in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION 9 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990). For discussion of
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tionist theories, 82 liberalism, 83 republicanism, 84 and various political
economies.8 5 And there was the Enlightenment, properly called the
"deep background" of all the dramatic political changes.86
The idea of progress enjoyed a central role among these varying
intellectual sources, but that does not mean it had the leading or dom-
inant role. But it is progress's characteristic, that of being a general
idea, that enabled it to fit all of these other ideas and enabled the
founders to ask questions about the future. It enabled them to posit
themselves on a continuous time line, aware of the past, but aware of
the future as well, and enabled them to ask how they could improve
life. As Professor Delmage notes, "It was natural for the political lead-
ers of the time to apply the idea of progress to politics during this
time. '' 87 The idea of progress enjoyed a wide support by the people
too, not only by the political elite. 88 It was more popular in the New
World than in the Old World, as a consequence of the major political
changes that took place over a relatively short time, and as a result of
the vast, rich land that was available.89 The geographic factor indicates
the close relation of the idea of progress in its American formulation
the influence of Locke, see generally MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION 11 (1978).
82 Bailyn emphasizes the role of radical thought. See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS,
supra note 34, passim, as well as Common Law (at 31), Puritanism (at 32), and social
thought of English Civil War time (at 34). See also BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 75, at 38-39, 54, 57-58.
83 Hartz presents the most forceful argument that celebrates the Lockean right-based
theory as the single most important theme in the revolutionary era. For a criticism of this
approach, see generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787 (1969).
84 Wood defines republicanism as "the ideology of the Enlightenment." See id. at viii.
As he explains, "republicanism" is not a particular form of government, but "the elimina-
tion of a king and the institution of an elective system." Id. at 47.
85 Charles Beard offered an economic interpretation of the Constitution, and argued
that it was the product of self-interest-motivated politicians. His work was controversial,
influential, and lastly repudiated, but nevertheless path breaking. See CHARLES A. BEARD,
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
(For an evaluation of Beard's work, see the introduction to the 1986 edition, by Forrest
McDonald).
86 See Bernard Bailyn, The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpreta-
tion in ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7 (Stephen G. Kurtz, James H. Hutson
eds., 1973).
87 Delmage, supra note 42, at 309. See also at 310 (the idea was widespread). See also
Nisbet's discussion of progress in eighteenth-century America, supra note 4, at 193-203;
Ekirch, supra note 35, at 25- 26.
88 Boorstin, supra note 28, at 77.
89 The land was "available" in the eyes of the immigrants. For the differences of the
idea of progress in its European origin and its American adaptation, see Ekirch, supra note
35, at 13, 37.
[Vol. 1:3
PROGRESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
to the idea of the frontier: setting new challenges to be conquered by
human beings. 90
Thus, progress served as a fertile background and a catalyst for
the dramatic political changes of the 1770s and 1780s. The pervasive-
ness of the idea is apparent in the Constitution. As much as it reflects
Enlightenment thought,91 so it reflects the idea of progress. This is the
case in both the specific wording of the Constitution and in its general
spirit, and actually in the idea of the Constitution itself.92 The pream-
ble of the Constitution declares as its first purpose "to form a more
perfect Union." This carries in few words the essence of progress:
human beings undertaking the task of perfecting their own lives. 93
Charles Beard points to the amending mechanism, established by the
Constitution, as a reflection of its acceptance of progress.94 Bernard
Bailyn taught us that constitutions were understood by the colonists
(in the process of becoming independent) "to be ideal designs of gov-
ernment. .. . -95 This sense, that the social artifact we call law can, and
in fact is, "a vital agency for human betterment, '96 survives up to our
time.97
What was the form of American progress? When the idea of pro-
gress was imported into the New World, it was still in the process of
transformation into its more secular form. Thus, other than the belief
in constant, gradual development towards a better human condition,
progress was still partially religious and it was losing the feature of its
inevitability. But as the idea was adapted to the newly discovered
land, its content turned more and more towards the political-intellec-
tual branch.
The settlers of the New World were, of course, religious, and the
Calvinist ethos has quite probably influenced the shaping of the politi-
90 The classical work remains FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY (1920). See also Ekirch, supra note 35, at 25 (tying the ideas of progress and
the frontier); see generally Mathiopoulos, supra note 27, chapter 9 (similar).
91 "The Constitution is perhaps the greatest monument of the Moderate Enlightenment
... May, supra note 47, at 99, 100. See also Wood, supra note 83, at 606 ("The Constitu-
tion represented both the climax and the finale of the American Enlightenment..
92 See Delmage, supra note 42, at 312-314.
93 For a different understanding of this goal, see MORTIMER J. ADLER, WE HOLD
THESE TRUTHS: UNDERSTANDING THE IDEAS AND IDEALS OF THE CONSTITUTION 14
(1987) ("['more perfect union' means] the indispensable condition of peace on this conti-
nent."). See also id., at 16.
94 In his introduction to Bury, supra note 28, at xxxvi, xxxviii. See also Delmage, supra
note 42, at 312 (similar).
95 Bailyn, supra note 34, at 230.
96 Felix Frankfurter (1915), quoted in Bickel, supra note 25, at 20.
97 Alexander Bickel described Legal Realism as a belief in "man-made progress," and
the Warren Court as the child of "these Progressive realists." Bickel, supra note 25, at 19.
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cal institutions.98 But during the eighteenth century the pessimistic
form of New England Puritanism was replaced by an optimistic Deist
belief.99 The latter allows more freedom than the deterministic Puri-
tanism, and enabled human beings to think about the future as some-
thing they could shape, not just be subordinated to. The change in
religious beliefs had taken place against the background of powerful
intellectual competition: the Enlightenment.
Whether from religious belief or from the celebration of reason,
man had been designated a new role in shaping the course of events.
Thus, the framers could declare that the Constitution is meant to
achieve a "more perfect Union"; thus they could accord Congress the
power "to promote ... Progress." In the old, religious form of pro-
gress, it was obvious that man had no role in progress but that of a
passive subject. Now men and women gained the power to control
their lives. Man himself is the engine of progress. The language of the
copyright clause shows the transitional stage of progress at the time; it
suggests the inevitable feature of progress.100 Progress happens by it-
self, but man is not a passive bystander. Progress can be aided.
The writings of the prominent founders also reveal their belief,
quite strong at times, in progress. Consider the author of the Declara-
tion of Independence, Thomas Jefferson. 10' He was a strong believer
in the idea of progress. 02 It was a belief in both forms of progress: the
political-intellectual and the material. The two were connected in Jef-
ferson's views and actions. He was an inventor himself and later a
member of the first Patent Board.103 This was the material progress.
The political-intellectual progress was part of his mix of optimism, be-
lief in the rationality of human beings, and a deep commitment to
knowledge as a guarantor of happiness. 0 4 Jefferson understood
knowledge to be the engine of democracy, and in fact, "[I]n the realm
98 See MARCI A. HAMILTON, THE REFORMED CONSTITUTION - REPRESENTATION,
CALVINISM, AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (forthcoming, 2001).
99 See generally, Riley, supra note 79.
100 For example, Blackstone held this view, though in his writing it still had a religious
gloss. See Boorstin, supra note 28, at 78, 82.
101 I will consider Jefferson as an example. There is a lot to be written about the place of
the idea of progress in the political thoughts and actions of many of the other founders.
102 See generally, EDWIN THOMAS MARTIN, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE IDEA OF PRO-
GRESS (1941) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin). See also Ekirch,
supra note 35, at 31-32.
103 The Supreme Court has attributed to Jefferson great influence on the 1793 Patent
Act, but Edward C. Walterscheid shows that the Court has created a "Jeffersonian mythol-
ogy," and overrated Jefferson's influence. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use and Abuse
of History: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson's Influence on the Pat-
ent Law, 39 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 195 (1999).
104 Martin, supra note 102, at 140, 142-43, 316.
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of government, Jefferson naturally identified the whole democratic
principle with progress. ' 10 5 Accordingly, he afforded great importance
to education. 10 6 This was seen by him to promote the progress of
knowledge. Thus he wrote: "I think by far the most important bill in
our whole code, is that for the diffusion of knowledge among people";
"Reason and free inquiry are the only effectual agents against error
•.. "; "[E]rror of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to
combat it"; "No one, more sincerely wishes the spread of information
among mankind than I do, and none has greater confidence in its ef-
fect towards supporting free and good government.' 10 7
James Madison, in a famous passage, tied democracy and self-
government to knowledge: "[A] popular government without popular
information or means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
and a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm them-
selves with the power knowledge gives."'10 8
It is this close relationship of the Constitution and the idea of
progress that emphasizes the meaning progress had at the time: it was
political progress. The framers and other statespersons at the close of
the eighteenth century understood progress as relating mainly to the
social and political perfection and development of the union, to the
continuous growth of knowledge. We will see this close relationship
between progress and politics in the discussion of copyright law, in the
next section.
The political content the framers read into progress does not
mean that they were not impressed by technological advancements. In
fact, they were fascinated by them. Jefferson was an inventor himself.
But material progress and political progress were intertwined. In as
far as the founders referred to the material aspect of progress, it was
understood by them to be a precondition to the political structure:
Jefferson and Franklin understood science to have "a liberating effect
on the politics of all nations."' 0 9 This rich concept of progress is re-
flected in copyright law and constructs it.
105 Id. at 144.
106 Id. at 321.
107 Quotation from a letter in 1786, before the Bill of Rights was enacted. All the quota-
tions in this paragraph are borrowed from Martin's work. See Martin, supra note 102, at
208-209.
108 THE WRITING OF JAMES MADISON 103 (1910).
109 Price, supra note 70, at vii. See also Mathiopoulos, supra note 27, at 110-11, 226.
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II.
THE INJECTION OF PROGRESS INTO COPYRIGHT LAW
By now, the early history of American copyright law has been
relatively explored: the origins in the English Common Law, the
(modest) colonial experience, and the constitutionalization of intellec-
tual property. This section outlines the history of copyright law, from
its English origins to its American adaptation in the Constitution. The
argument here is that English copyright law was, at least until the end
of the eighteenth century, more of a trade regulation than a political
concept, but in its American incarnation the emphasis was switched: it
was first a political idea and only second a trade regulation. 110 The
politicization was achieved through the injection of the idea of pro-
gress into copyright law as its guiding concept.
A. The English Origins of Copyright Law: Trade Regulation
The conventional time line of American copyright law begins
across the Atlantic Ocean, in sixteenth-century England. An earlier
date and location can be attributed to the invention of movable type
by Johannes Gutenberg in 1455,11 and to the evolving printing indus-
try of Venice in the second half of the sixteenth century."12
The main features of this history are along two lines. One is that
copyright law started as ancillary to censorship, but slowly became an
independent legal artifact. The second line is that the rights the law
created were, at first, those of the publishers, and only later became
authors' rights. These two transformations were completed before the
adoption and application of copyright law in the colonies, and thus
require only a short summary.
110 Professor Patterson identified four stages in American copyright law, and four main
ideas. Each period emphasized a different idea, without excluding the other ideas. The four
periods are marked by major events in the field: the states' laws, the Constitution, the
Federal Act of 1790, and finally the case of Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 33 U.S. 591
(1834). The four ideas are the protection of authorship, the promotion of learning, the
regulation of the book trade, and the prevention of harmful monopoly. I am especially
interested in the second period, the Constitutional period, and the dominant idea that Pat-
terson found therein, namely the promotion of learning (at 180-81, 193). In the other
phases, Patterson rates this idea to occupy second place (in the states' phase and the Fed-
eral Act) and third place (in Wheaton).
111 Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/l/0,5716,
39381+3,00.html (last visited March 12, 2001).
112 BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 43-48
(Public Affairs Press, 1967). See also Rose, supra note 7, at 9-11.
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1. 1538-1694
Copyright was an unintended outcome of monarchial control
over the evolving printing industry." 3 Its early buds were in the 1538
establishment of a royal licensing system by King Henry VIII. The
purpose was to prevent the publication of "naughty printed books." 114
Two decades later, in 1557, Queen Mary issued a charter to the Sta-
tioners' (printers') Company. 115 She had one interest in mind, her
own. The charter established a monopoly over the new book industry,
and only a member of the company was allowed to print books. The
licensing system and the monopoly were tools in the hands of the
monarchs: their purpose was not so much a concern for the new indus-
try, but for the stability of their regime. The monopoly created a con-
venient bottleneck where the content of the books and other printed
articles could be examined. In other words, it enabled an effective
censorship. The Stationers' monopoly enabled the prevention of pub-
lication and dissemination of anything that might threaten the monar-
chy.116 The company, however faithfully it followed the orders,
channeled its power to its own benefit. The monopoly gave it a strong
bargaining power vis-A-vis authors, who could not publish their works
anywhere else; vis-A-vis the consumers, regarding prices; and vis-A-vis
other printers who were not part of the company and booksellers who
were not printers.117 The last factor is especially important. The high
cost of producing a book and the low cost of reproducing it resulted in
copying and damage to the financial incentives of publishers." 8
This censorship-motivated legal monopoly continued from 1557
to 1694, including the period of the English Civil War.119 The sources
113 The common cradle of copyright and censorship was also the case in Venice. See
Rose, supra note 7, at 11. The same was true in France. See Hesse, supra note 8, at 111-12.
This was also the case in Jewish communities in fifteenth-century Italy. See NAHUM
RAKOVER, COPYRIGHT IN JEWISH SOURCES 133, 136 (1991).
114 See Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/8/
0,5716,117358+23,00.html (last visited March 12, 2001).
115 The Stationers' Company was established in 1403. For a thorough history of the Sta-
tioners, see CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS' COMPANY: A HISTORY 1403-1959
(Stanford, 1960). See also LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPEC-
TiVE (Nashville, 1968), Ch. 3 at 28.
116 See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3 (1967). See also
Blagden; Patterson, at 36-41; Rose, supra note 7, at 12-13; PUTNAM, THE QUESTION OF
COPYRIGHT 27, 114 (New York, 2d ed., 1896).
117 Blagden, at 31-33, 63-64; Patterson, at 43; Putnam, at 9; Bugbee, supra note 112, at
51.
118 See A.J.K. Robinson, The Evolution of Copyright, 1476-1776, 22 CAMBRIAN L. REV.
55 (1991).
119 For discussion of the various legislation, see Blagden, at 40-46 (ordinances of 1559,
1562); 70-74 (decrees of 1566, 1586); 117-121 (decree of 1637); 145-147 (Parliament's ordi-
nances of 1643, 1649, 1652); 148 (Licensing Act of 1662); AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, THE LAW
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of the institutionalized monopoly varied during this period. The royal
charter was replaced first with decrees of the notorious Court of the
Star Chamber (first issued in 1586), and then with the statute of mo-
nopolies (1624) and further decrees of the Star Chamber (1637). But
the latter was abolished in 1641, when the Civil War began. For a short
while, the book trade remained unregulated, but despite the violent
political turmoil of those days, Parliament reinstated the licensing sys-
tem (1643) and then produced a few orders against unlicensed print-
ing. °20 It was at that time that John Milton published his famous
Areopagitica, which is commonly taken to be a manifesto for free
speech. 121 But it was narrower in its immediate purpose: to fight
against the renewal of the Licensing Act. 122 Milton himself was "toler-
ant" only towards those with whom he agreed-for instance, Catholics
did not enjoy his tolerance. 23 Later on, Milton himself became a li-
censor-censor.
124
Under the Commonwealth, Parliament enacted the Licensing Act
(1649) and the Printing Act (1653), which somewhat curtailed the Sta-
tioners' power. When the monarchy was restored, the various legal
sources were once again reenacted, this time in the Licensing Act
(1662), which was renewed several times (in 1664, 1665, 1685, and
1693), until it finally lapsed, in 1694. The House of Commons refused
to renew the Act. That refusal marked the beginning of a fifteen-year
political debate, in which the Stationers' lobbied for an act that would
preserve their monopolistic power. They succeeded, or at least so they
thought, when the Statute of Anne was enacted. 125
2. The Statute of Anne, 1709
Since the 1640s there was a gradual demise in the Stationers'
power 126 and a growing divergence of censorship from the book trade.
AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS, 59-68 (South Hackensack, N.J., 1899); Patterson,
Chapter 6 at 114. For a survey of the different acts see also GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 26-38 (1847), and HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST
COPYRIGHT STATUTE: AN ESSAY ON AN ACT FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING,
1710 (1956).
120 See Ransom, at 66-75.
121 AREOPAGITICA (1644; Bandanna Books edition, Santa Barbara, Cal., 1992).
122 Id. at 43-44.
123 LEONARD L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN His-
TORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 95-96 (Torchbook edition, 1963).
124 PHILIP GAUNT, CHOOSING THE NEWS: THE PROFIT FACTOR IN NEWS SELECTION 24
(New York, 1990).
125 For an account of the political struggle in 1694-1709, see Patterson, supra note 115, at
139-142; Ransom, supra note 119, at 90-92.
126 Blagden, supra note 115, at 175-177; Rose, supra note 7, at 33; R. F. WHALE, COPY-
RIGHT: EVOLUTION, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 4-7 (Totowa, N.J., 1972).
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To be sure, the censorial interests did not suddenly disappear: the
state pursued them under a new legal avenue, that of libel. The pub-
lishers as well did not lose all the power gained since 1538, but the
foundation of the regulation now was no longer the combined inter-
ests of the monarchy and the publishers. The publishers were on their
own.
In 1709, the Statute of Anne was enacted. 2 7 Its long title read:
"An Act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of
printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the
times herein mentioned." 2 8 Its main instructions were the limitation
of the Stationers' existing copyright to a period of 21 years, the award-
ing of new copyrights for a period of 14 years (with an option for
renewal), and a registration requirement. Professor L. Ray Patterson
analyzed the statute closely, and explained that it was aimed at regu-
lating three monopolies created by the printing and licensing acts of
the seventeenth century. These were the Stationers' monopoly, the
monopoly of the booksellers within the Stationers, and the printing
patent.1 29 He concluded, accordingly, that it is better seen as a trade
regulation than as a copyright act, at least as we understand the latter
term today.130
This description is backed up both by the legislative history of the
statute and by its subsequent interpretation. The titles of the bills that
were considered after the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1694 indicate
their regulatory content: "A Bill for regulating of printing and print-
ing-presses" (1697), "An act for the better regulating of printers, and
printing-presses" (1698), "A bill to prevent licentiousness of the
press" (1703).131 The repetitive failures of the printers to achieve their
goal brought them to change their strategy. In 1709, the London
Booksellers were allowed to present Parliament a bill to secure prop-
erty,132 which became the Statute of Anne. In this sense, it was a prop-
erty law, rather than a trade regulation.
But, despite the statute's language providing for rights of authors,
there is a consensus among scholars that this was a strategy taken by
the printers to ensure their ongoing control of the industry, taking into
consideration the common practice of the day that authors transferred
127 8 Ann. c. 19 (1709). Some scholars mention the year of the statute as 1710. The
confusion is caused by changes in the calendar. See Patterson, supra note 115, at 3.
128 The full text of the statute can be found in Ransom, supra note 119, at 109. For a
detailed history of the political and legal changes that concluded in the statute, see Patter-
son, id. at 143-150.
129 See Patterson at 144.
130 Id. at 14, 143, 150.
131 Id. at 140-41.
132 See Rose, supra note 7, at 42.
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all their rights to the publishers. 133 This last fact indicates that there
was not a real competition among the publishers.1 34
A series of legal disputes culminated in the definitive interpreta-
tion of the statute only 65 years later, when the House of Lords ruled,
in the famous case of Donaldson v. Becket, that copyright is a statu-
tory right, and thus is not perpetual.135 But at its institution and until
the 1774 Donaldson case, the Statute of Anne was understood merely
as a trade regulation, rather than as a property law.136 It was driven by
trade concerns, and addressed them. Donaldson marks the failure of
the Stationers' strategy. Their intentions-to use the author as a con-
venient hook for their interests-were not realized. A new legal status
was established, that of an author. 137
Another recent study challenges the common view that the Stat-
ute of Anne is the first copyright law. Brad Sherman and Lionel
Bently argue that modern copyright emerged only as late as the mid-
133 Patterson, supra note 115, at 147; Kaplan, supra note 116, at 8; Jaszi & Woodmansee,
Introduction, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 9, at 7; Jaszi, supra note
10, at 468-469.
134 One scholar mentioned other factors that enabled the publishers to control competi-
tion, such as town planning laws, social security legislation, and industrial training regula-
tions. See Peter Prescott, The Origins of Copyright: A Debunking View, 6 EIPR 453 (1989).
He further suggests that the real motivation behind the publishers' interest was to prevent
parallel imports from Scotland, where there were no copyright laws. Whether this sugges-
tion is more accurate or not, it is clear that authors were just a pawn in the publishers'
game. See id. at 454-455.
135 Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 ER 257 (1774). These legal disputes are the
main scene where the notion of the author was constructed, and they have deserved the
close attention of the authorship project (see especially Rose, supra note 7, and his The
Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741), in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note
9, at 211). My purpose here is different. It is to lay the background for the injection of the
idea of progress into American copyright law, toward the end of the eighteenth century.
136 Mark Rose describes the Statute of Anne as the "reestablishment of copyright under
the rubric of property rather than of regulation." (Rose, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, at 48).
But this assertion should be read against the background of the authorship project, and
more specifically, the notion of the romantic author; hence it is hindsight. Rose himself
notes that the bill that later became the Statute "revealed its lineal relationship to the old
Licensing Act of 1662" (id. at 42). The Statute established copyright as property only after
the "author" was constructed.
137 THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 9, passim; WOODMANSEE, THE
GENIUS AND COPYRIGHT, supra note 8; Rose, supra note 7. The construction of the notion
of "authorship" was not unique to England, though in other European countries this socio-
legal construction took different courses. The French Monarchy created a regulatory
scheme, two years before the revolution, which acknowledged authors' rights. This regula-
tion was deliberately meant to bypass publishers, to ensure better control over the writings.
See Hesse, supra note 8, at 114. John Feather suggests that "it would be perverse to claim
that authors' rights were widely recognized in pre-revolutionary England, it would be more
accurate, although still perhaps a slight exaggeration, to suggest that they were dimly per-
ceived." John Feather, From Rights in Copies to Copyright: The Recognition of Author's
Rights in English Law and Practice in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in THE CON-
STRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 9, 191, at 208.
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die of the nineteenth century. 138 It was only then, they argue, that the
Statute of Anne came to be understood as the origin of copyright
law.139
In sum, English copyright law was born as ancillary to censorship
and slowly diverged from it until it became an independent legal re-
gime. But during the eighteenth century it was merely a regulation of
the printing and publishing trades. Despite its title, "An Act for the
encouragement of learning," the Statute of Anne did not reflect a
philosophical concept at the time of its enactment or until its defini-
tive interpretation in 1774. A possible objection might point to the
purpose of the statute, as declared in its title: it signals that the Act
was no longer part of censorship. The answer to this objection is that
the statute lacked a forward-looking vision. Its purpose was to look
backwards, to regulate an already existing market, and to avoid the
deficiencies caused by monopolies. But the title did carry the seed of
the political conception of copyright, which emerged only once it was
replanted in American soil.
B. The American Adaptation of Copyright Law: A
Political Concept
American copyright law was to be construed out of the English
ingredients. Censorship was no longer one of these ingredients, and
the construction of authorship was not yet completed. My argument
here is that in the process of introduction of copyright law into the
newly created American political system, it was also adapted, and its
essence shifted. It was no longer just a trade regulation, but became a
political concept. This concept is what the Supreme Court would call,
a century and a half later, an "economic philosophy," but it is a philos-
ophy that operates within the wide framework of the idea of progress;
there is more to it than that. It is not merely the general version of
progress (a general idea) but rather what I called political-intellectual
progress. This process of politicization of copyright law, through the
injection of the idea of progress, took place during the 1780s, when
the American constitutional system was invented. This section begins
by outlining the timeline of American copyright law in the eighteenth
century. I then go into details of events that injected the idea of pro-
gress into copyright law.
138 BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911 (Cambridge, U.K., 1999).
139 Id. at 207-08.
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1. The Colonial Period
During the colonial period there had been little literary activity,
and practically no legal protection for literary works, with one excep-
tion: a 1672 Massachusetts law, 38 years before the Statue of Anne. 140
The Articles of Confederation contained no copyright (or patent)
clause. Copyright was to be dealt with by the states. Some state consti-
tutions of the early 1780s addressed issues of encouragement of learn-
ing but did not create a copyright system. Connecticut was the first
state to enact a copyright law, soon followed by Massachusetts and
Maryland. 141 The state legislative activity was boosted by a 1783 con-
gressional resolution, which resulted in a series of copyright laws in
nine more states.142 By the time the Constitutional Convention met in
1787, in Philadelphia, the framers had had this experience, as well as
the English experience, and the delegates were lobbied by a group of
prominent authors. The Convention composed the constitutional
clause in its current form, and it was approved without debate. Shortly
thereafter, in 1790, Congress passed the first federal Copyright Act.
This is the course of events that resulted in a federal system of
copyright, with a constitutional anchor. Our view is focused on one
decade, from 1780 to 1790. What follows is not an attempt to provide
a comprehensive historical account, but rather a search for the under-
standing of copyright law, and I will show that it was a political con-
cept, inspired by the idea of progress.
2. State Copyright Laws
Following a couple of private ordinances issued by the Connecti-
cut state legislature, that state was the first to enact a general copy-
right law, which was to become a model for several other states.143
140 Bugbee, supra note 112, at 65-66; Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright 29 WAYNE L.
REV. 1119, 1171-1172 (1983). The Massachusetts 1672 Act did not, however, award the
rights to the authors, but to publishers. Bugbee explains the 1672 law to be a general one,
but its language ("in ansr to the petition of John Vsher, the Court [Mass. legislature is
known today as the General Court] judgeth it meete to order, & be it by this Court or-
dered & enacted.) suggests that it was a "private" law, specifically granting protection
to Usher.
141 The text of these statutes can be found in the Library of Congress' COPYRIGHT LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1783-1952 (Washington, D.C., 1952).
142 The exception was Delaware. See Patterson, supra note 115, at 183-92; Bugbee,
supra note 112, at 112-13. For a comparative discussion of these statutes, see Francine
Crawford, Pre-Constitutional Copyright Statutes 23 BULLETIN OF THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY
OF THE USA 11 (1975).
143 There seems to be some disagreement as to which states were influenced by the
Connecticut statute. Bugbee found it influenced New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
and North Carolina, as well as indirectly influenced Virginia, Georgia, and New York. Pat-
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Another model was that offered by Massachusetts (and copied by
New Hampshire and Rhode Island). These various statutes were all
influenced, at least to some degree, by the Statute of Anne, and eight
of these had explanatory preambles. The preamble of the Connecticut
statute read:
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to principles of natural equity and
justice, that every author should be secured in receiving the profits
that may arise from the sale of his works, and such security may
encourage men of learning and genius to publish their writings;
which may do honor to their country, and service to mankind. 144
And the preamble of the 1783 Massachusetts copyright statute read:
Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civiliza-
tion, the public weal of the community, and the advancement of
human happiness, greatly depend on the efforts of learned and inge-
nious persons in the various arts and sciences: As the principal en-
couragement such persons can have to make great and beneficial
exertions of this nature, must exist in the legal security of the fruits
of their study and industry to themselves; and as such security is one
of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more pecu-
liarly a man's own than that which is produced by the labour of his
mind .. .145
Both preambles carry two conceptual elements, but their order is
different. The Connecticut statute explains and justifies copyright on
the basis of "natural equity and justice." This is a theory of natural
rights. Only then does the preamble speculate ("may") that this might
benefit the public: copyright might encourage publication, which in
turn might honor the country and "service humankind." But it is quite
clear that the public benefits are a consequence of the copyright, not
its reason. Furthermore, the authors of the preamble sound somewhat
skeptical about the causal linkage between the copyright and the pub-
lic benefit.
The Massachusetts preamble, by contrast, starts with the public
benefit. This is not Connecticut's skeptical view, but a confident decla-
ration. The public benefit is spelled out: It is not just publication, and
the national goal of "honor to the country" is absent. Rather, it is a
lofty and general benefit that elaborates what Connecticut summa-
rized in the vague term "service to mankind." The public benefit ac-
cording to the Massachusetts statute is worth repeating. It is "the
improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the public
terson identifies the influence on Georgia and New York. This disagreement does not bear
on the discussion here.
144 Reprinted in Patterson, supra note 115, at 186-87.
145 Reprinted in Patterson, id. at 187.
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weal of the community, and the advancement of human happiness.' '1 46
The public benefit is spelled out as a justification for the copyright
system established by the statute. This is also the first explicit mention
of progress in connection with copyright in an official document. This
public basis for copyright is coupled with an explicit natural-rights jus-
tification, but it is quite clear that this is an accompanying justification,
and not a primary one.
The public emphasis in the Massachusetts statute should be read
against the background of that state's Constitution. The second sec-
tion of the fifth chapter of the Massachusetts Constitution, written by
John Adams, is entitled "The Encouragement of Literature, Etc." and
still reads as follows:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among
the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their
rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportu-
nities and advantages of education in the various parts of the coun-
try, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the
duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sci-
ences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cam-
bridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns; to
encourage private societies and public institutions, rewards and im-
munities, for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce,
trades, manufactures, and a natural history of the country; to coun-
tenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benev-
olence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty
and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humor, and all so-
cial affections, and generous sentiments among the people.147
This wide grant of power relates not only to intellectual property
laws but also to direct state patronage. The goals, however, are the
same in both cases. The most interesting point here is that literature
and knowledge are regarded as a necessary means to achieve demo-
cratic ideals of protecting "rights and liberties." This is a first place
where we can note that knowledge is assigned a direct political pur-
pose. It states that literature and the sciences are not cherished as
ends in themselves, but as means to achieve democratic values. The
specific and concrete means, of supporting the enumerated institu-
tions, are ways to achieve the promotion of literature, science, and
146 See id.
147 John Adams was surprised at the time by the unanimous approval of the Massachu-
setts legislature. These words, he later wrote, "I would not now exchange for a sceptre, and
wish may be engraved on my tomb stone." Letter to Benjamin Waterhouse, August 7,
1805. Reprinted in STATESMAN AND FRIEND - CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN ADAMS WITH
BENJAMIN WATERHOUSE 1784-1822, 22- 27 (W.C. Ford ed., Boston, 1927).
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knowledge (which all have the same meaning), which is also an impor-
tant stage in the creation, realization, and maintenance of the ultimate
value: democracy.
Copyright law made its first steps in the independent states. But
during the 1780s there were more signs that copyright was a national
matter, a recognition that led to its inclusion in the Constitution. The
first signal of this recognition was the Congressional resolution of
1783, mentioned above. The resolution itself recommends that the
states enact copyright laws, and goes into some detail, such as the du-
ration of the protection (14 years, with an option to renew), and was
quite obviously influenced by the Statute of Anne.148 It did have an
interesting recommendation, that the copyright be limited to citizens
of the United States. We have seen the national interest in the Con-
necticut preamble, and shall return to it shortly. The resolution does
not offer a justification for the recommended laws. But we can find
some hints in the preceding Congressional resolution, to appoint the
committee that authored this recommendation. The committee was to
consider "the most proper means of cherishing genius and useful arts
through the United States by securing to the authors or publishers of
new books their property in such works. 149
The resemblance of this resolution to the structure of the Consti-
tutional clause is striking. Indeed, the main innovation of this resolu-
tion is that it is void of natural-rights language, and offers instead an
economic basis for copyright law: the property rights accorded to indi-
viduals are the means to achieve the public interest. The public goal,
though, is quite narrow: to cherish genius and useful arts. This resolu-
tion resulted in nine more states enacting copyright law within the
next three years.
3. Lobbying and Nationality
This fertile legislative activity, as well as the constitutionalization
of copyright which we are yet to observe, is attributed, inter alia, to a
successful campaign of a few authors. 50 Chief among them was Noah
Webster (1758-1843), first on the state level, and later at the federal
148 The resolution read: "Resolved, that it be recommended to the several states, to
secure to the authors or publishers of new books the copyright of such books .. " Re-
printed in COPYRIGHT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1783-1952, supra note
141, at 1. For the resemblance to the statute of Anne, see Patterson, supra note 115, at 183.
149 Reprinted in Bugbee, supra note 112, at 112.
150 For a skeptical view on the effect of this campaign, see Edward C. Walterscheid, To
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of The Intel-
lectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 40-41
(1994).
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one. 151 The lobbyists were petitioning not only for protection for their
own rights. They supplemented their self-interest with a national in-
terest.1 52 The latter is interesting, for it carries a conception of copy-
right. The national argument is in fact composed of three separate
arguments. One is the practical need for uniformity among the states,
another regards the international arena, and the third is political, and
thus the most interesting for our purpose.
The need for uniformity was simple and clear. It was a combina-
tion of efficiency and politics. Intellectual works crossed the borders
of the states easily, and the states' statutes varied in their details, such
as formalities and the duration of protection. There was a need for
uniformity and for a central registration that would enable efficient
protection (at the time, registration was compulsory in most states).
The frequent travels of Webster and other authors to various states to
petition for individual protection illustrated this need. This need was
later acknowledged by Madison, in Federalist 43, where he wrote that
"the states cannot separately make effectual provision for either of
the cases [copyright and patent]." 153 This practical consideration en-
joyed the obvious support of the federalists, for it helped their more
general cause. 154
The second prong of the national argument was politics on the
international level. The new nation felt the need to show its indepen-
dence, and that included cultural independence. We saw this line of
argument in the preamble to the Connecticut copyright statute, which
spoke of "honor to [the] country" as one of the reasons for establish-
ing a system of copyright, 55 and in the Congressional resolution of
1783, which limited the protection to American citizens only. This was
a strong theme in the authors' campaign. "America," Webster peti-
tioned the Connecticut and New York legislators, "must be as
151 Bugbee, supra note 112, at 106; Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution: Why Did the Framers Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 361, 371 (1992); RICHARD J. Moss, NOAH WEBSTER (Boston, 1984); HARLOW GILES
UNGER, NOAH WEBSTER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN PATRIOT 55-57 (New
York, 1998). Webster's biographers seem to share an admiration for their subject, and yield
to his unofficial title as "father of American copyright legislation." See Moss at 7; see Un-
ger at 108. The lobbying continued after the constitutionalization of copyright law, with the
successful aim of a federal law. For some of the lobbyists' petitions, see the Library of
Congress' COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS 1789-1904, 112-115, 123, 125 (Thorvald Solberg ed.,
Washington D.C., 1905).
152 Moss at 9, and note Unger's title of the biography.
153 See James Madison, THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Everyman, William R. Brock ed.,
London, 1996) at 220.
154 For discussion of this aspect see Donner, supra note 151, at 374; Walterscheid, supra
note 150, at 24.
155 See supra note 144.
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independent in literature as it is in Politics, as famous of arts as for
arms."156 In the decade following the Independence, this argument
did not require elaboration. The new nation had to prove to the Old
World, and presumably to itself, that it could stand on its own feet in
the intellectual field.
There is yet another feature of the national argument, a political
one, which, once again, is apparent in the powerful words of Webster:
"An attention to literature must be the principal bulwark against the
encroachments of civil and ecclesiastical tyrants, and American Lib-
erty can die only with her Maecenases. ' 157
This is a clear articulation of the new spirit that was injected into
American copyright law, one that is deeply tied to its political essence.
Literature was understood to be an instrument to ensure liberty. It
was understood to be an essential weapon against tyranny, whether by
a government or a religious institution. Webster directly tied copyright
to strengthening liberty. We thus see that the justification for copy-
right law was articulated as a legal tool to achieve a public goal. It was
not only the general statements found in the preambles of the states'
statutes, for it touched directly upon the essence of the American
spirit of independence and of the Constitution to come.
The lobbyists, then, argued simultaneously for the national good
and for their own interests. This convergence of interests conveyed
another message, which was not otherwise explicit in their arguments,
and perhaps they did not even notice it. It was the basic structure of
copyright law as we know it today: that to achieve the public good, the
law should aim at private interest.
The political motivation with its democratic content is one of the
pillars of the original understanding of American copyright law. This
pillar constitutes the essence of the constitutional language that em-
phasizes the public. I now turn to the Constitution itself.
4. Constitutionalization
Historians of American copyright law do not know much about
the making of the constitutional clause, and most of what we have is
historical interpretation, or at times, speculation.15 8 The direct evi-
156 Bugbee, supra note 112, at 108. See also Webster's petition to the general assembly
of Connecticut, printed in Moss, supra note 151, at 6.
157 Quoted in Bugbee at 108. Gaius Cilinius Maecenas was a Roman patron of the arts
in the days of Augustus, during the first century B.C.
158 The speculations point to the large number of lawyers among the delegates to the
Convention, and their state-legislative experience. From this they deduce a familiarity with
the state copyright laws. See Walterscheid supra note 150, at 29 (describing his own
method as a speculation).
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dence as to actual adoption of the clause is not quite informative.
What we do know is that the delegates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion were presented with two quite similar proposals, one by James
Madison and the other by Charles Pinckney, a delegate from South
Carolina. 159 The proposals were for a grant of power to the Congress,
and distinguished patents from copyrights.160 The proposals were re-
ferred unanimously to the Committee of Detail, 161 and New York's
delegate David Brearley presented the clause on September 5, 1787,
in the form we are familiar with today. It was unanimously approved.
The convention held its discussion behind closed doors, so we have no
information about it. The only direct evidence is Madison's notes, but
these do not include reports of the discussion held by the Committee
of Detail, only its final proposal:' 62
The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. 16
3
We do not know what the immediate reasoning for this particular
formation and wording of the clause was. 164 Its second part, that
which elaborates the means to achieve the goal ("by securing ... "),
resembles the Continental Congress's charge to a committee to draft a
resolution in 1783.165 But the final proposal had at least three novel
elements in comparison to previous copyright law. One is the decision
to combine the power to enact patent legislation with the power to
protect copyrights. 166 A second new element was the elimination of
publishers from the picture. The last innovation, but most relevant for
our purposes, was the explicit invoking of the idea of progress. This
might seem a minor and irrelevant point to contemporary constitu-
tional interpreters, but progress was a buzzword at the time. Though
159 Bugbee, supra note 112, at 126. There seems to be a posthumous credit debate be-
tween Madison and Pinckney, with no definite victory of either. See Bugbee at 127; Walter-
scheid, supra note 150, at 25, 44-51.
160 See 1787: DRAFTING THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 904-905 (Wilbourn E. Ben-
ton ed., Vol. 1, 1986). Madison's proposal read: "To secure to literary authors their copy
rights for a limited time." Pinckney's proposal read: "to secure to authors exclusive rights
for a certain time."
161 Bugbee, supra note 112, at 126.
162 See DRAFTING THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, supra note 160, at 928.
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
164 See Walterscheid, supra note 150, at 34. Walterscheid argues, for example, that the
means of creating (or securing) copyright rights was chosen simply because it was the
cheapest way to achieve the goal.
165 See Bugbee, supra note 149.
166 This coupling has caused much confusion and, subsequently, attempts to dissect the
clause. There are numerous confusions, and almost any possible combination of "science
and useful arts" is attributed to copyright and to patents.
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its insertion was surely no accident, we do not know precisely why the
word entered the constitutional clause. "Progress" did not appear in
either Madison's or Pinckney's proposals, nor did it appear in the
Continental Congress's resolution of 1783. The English origin of
American copyright law was also not its source. The only explicit men-
tion of progress prior to the constitutionalization of copyright law is
found in the 1783 Massachusetts Copyright Act. 167
In the remainder of this section, I argue that the Constitution re-
flects both material progress and political-intellectual progress, but
that copyright reflects the latter alone.
5. Useful Arts and Science
Scholars, dissecting the the constitutional clause, attribute "useful
Arts" to patents only, and reserve "Science" for copyright. 168 There is
evidence for this distinction beyond the text of the Constitution. The
patent statutes referred to useful arts,169 Congress indicated a similar
understanding, 170 and so did the courts.1 71 We can reach the same con-
clusion based on the essence of patents, and their difference from
copyright. One of the earliest requirements for according an invention
the status of a patent is its utility,1 72 dating back to the first patent acts
of the 1790s. 173 This might not be the most important requirement,
and it "plays only a minor role as a requisite to patentability,"1174 but
copyright law never had this requirement or a similar one. In fact,
copyright law rejected useful articles as its subject matter. In the areas
of "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works," courts struggle to separate
the utilitarian function of works from their expressive features, and
protect only the latter. 175 The 1976 Act explicitly excludes "procedure,
process, system, method of operation" from copyright protection, as
167 See Patterson, supra note 149; see also Louis ADAMS FROTHINGHAM, A BRIEF His-
TORY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF MASSACHUSETTS 25-26 (Boston,
1916).
168 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-
66.7, n. 1; Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 83, 84 (1950).
169 See, e.g., the first Patent Act of 1790, titled Acts to Promote the Progress of Useful
Arts (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 101).
170 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 (1952) (House Report accompanying the 1952 Pat-
ent Act).
171 See, e.g., Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
172 See 35 U.S.C. § 101. See also Patent & Trademark Office Utility Examination Guide-
lines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36263-02 (1995).
173 See Lowel v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (Cir. C., D. Mass. 1817) (Story, J.).
174 MARTIN J. ADELMEN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 183 (St. Paul,
Minn., 1998).
175 See, e.g., Mazer, supra note 22 (works of art that are incorporated as designs of
useful articles are copyrightable); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d
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well as works that "portray[ ]" a "useful article[ ] as such. ' 176 Courts
have distinguished the utilitarian from the expressive. 177
The constitutional clause applies progress to "useful Arts" (as
well as to "Science"). I suggest we view it as relating to what I called
material progress. The patent system is meant to achieve the prosper-
ity of humankind. Inventions that make life more comfortable, save
labor, time, and money, are all useful arts-and of course so are in-
ventions that can save lives. They promote the "weal of the public."
This reflects the belief that better technology improves the human
condition.
But the more relevant term for us is "Science." It is obvious that
it exceeds the relatively narrow range of the natural sciences such as
medicine, chemistry, and physics. At the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, "'science' was synonymous with 'knowledge' and 'learning.' "178
The titles of many of the Copyright Acts during the past 200 years
make this point. The first act (1790), for instance, was titled "An Act
for the encouragement of Learning. '179 Learning, recall, was the sub-
ject matter of copyright ever since it diverged from censorship. The
title of the Statute of Anne states that it was for "the encouragement
of learning, 18 0 even though the statute itself, as we saw, was merely a
trade regulation, and did not reflect deeper concepts, despite this title.
So the subject matter of progress, to be achieved through the sys-
tem of copyright law, was knowledge. In the Massachusetts pream-
ble's list of public goals, "improvement of knowledge" is the first,
followed by "the progress of civilization." Recall Webster's advocacy.
He brought up liberty, and copyright as an instrument to secure it.
This understanding of copyright law as related to knowledge was crys-
tallized in the Constitution, with its enumerated goal, "to promote the
Progress of Science." A clear endorsement of this understanding is
found in the events that preceded the first Copyright Act, enacted in
989 (2d Cir. 1980) (introducing the test of "conceptual separability" to distinguish orna-
mental aspects of belt buckles from their utilitarian function).
176 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); § 113(b), and definition of "useful article" in § 101.
177 See, e.g., Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (Cir. Ct., S.D.N.Y., 1829). The Court of
Appeals found that a publication in a newspaper cannot be worthy of copyright protection,
because of its "mere temporary use" (compare this statement to the contemporary treat-
ment of momentary storage in a computer RAM as "copying"). But for our purposes, it is
a distinction the court made that is of interest: "The title of the act of congress is for the
encouragement of learning (2 Bior. & D. Laws, 104 [1 Stat. 124]), and was not intended for
the encouragement of mere industry, unconnected with learning and the sciences."
178 Walterscheid, supra note 150, at 51; Lutz, supra note 168, at 84.
179 The statute can be found in Copyright Laws supra note 141. (1 Stat. 124); See also
Patterson, supra note 115, at 197; Bugbee, supra note 112, at 141; Wilma S. Davis, "Fore-
word: Bulletin Nos. 13, 14, and 15 of the Copyright Office," xi (Washington D.C., 1980).
180 See Ransom, supra note 128.
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1790, one year after the Constitution was ratified. This Act was the
result of President George Washington's address to Congress. His ad-
dress is worth reporting at length. I insert numbers to facilitate the
discussion that will follow:
[T]here is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the
promotion of science and literature.
[1] Knowledge is, in every country, the surest basis of public
happiness.
[2] In [a country] in which the measures of government receive
their impression so immediately from the sense of the community as
in ours, it is proportionably essential.
To the security of a free constitution it contributes in various ways:
[3] By convincing those who are intrusted with the public adminis-
tration that every valuable end of government is best answered by
the enlightened confidence of the public;
[4] and by teaching the people themselves to know and to value
their own rights; [5] to discern and provide against invasions of
them;
[6] to distinguish between oppression and the necessary exercise of
lawful authority ... [7] to discriminate the spirit of liberty from that
of licentiousness, cherishing the first, avoiding the last, and uniting a
speedy but temperate vigilance against encroachments, with an invi-
olable respect to the laws.18'
The House echoed: "[T]he promotion of science and literature
will contribute to the security of a free Government,"' 182 and two
weeks later enacted the first federal Copyright Act. We can find in
Washington's address the belief in the importance of knowledge to the
community [1]. Knowledge is not only good, but is essential. The sec-
ond point Washington made for the importance of knowledge touches
upon the structure of the political system. He acknowledged the im-
portance of knowledge in facilitating the flow of information between
the governed and the government. This proposition clarifies what it
was that Washington addressed. It was not knowledge in an abstract
form, but rather in a concrete substance, i.e., information, and the role
he assigned information was to facilitate the self-government of the
people. 183
181 President Washington, Address to both Houses of Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted
in THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS, 1789-1904 at 115-116 (1905) (layout of
the text edited). Washington mentioned a few measures to promote learning: "aids to semi-
naries ... institution of a national university or by any other expedients."
182 Id. at 117-118.
183 See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, re-
printed in POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965). It
is striking to compare these ideas to more recent political thought that explains why and
how information is a vital element of self-government.
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Washington then listed a few points to make the case for the im-
portance of knowledge to a "free constitution," i.e., to the political
system. The first [3] is that knowledge serves as a check on the public
administration. The remaining points [4-7] are that knowledge is an
instrument to protect liberty. This echoes Webster's argument in favor
of literature as a safeguard for liberty. Webster mentioned literature
as the subject matter of the copyright system he was advocating. 184
Washington replaced literature with knowledge as the subject matter
of copyright. This is an instrumental view: that knowledge plays a role
in protecting human liberties.
Learning and knowledge are thus to be understood as essential to
the ultimate goal of creating and sustaining an informed citizenry that
constantly engages in a project of deliberation. The more citizens en-
gage in the public discourse, the better the quality of the collective
deliberation. The notion of learning is deeply tied to basic ideas that
constitute our contemporary understanding of democracy: self-gov-
ernment of the people and participation in the common project of de-
mocracy on equal terms. 18 5
Here we are interested in more than the words. We are interested
in what they stand for; it is the conception of copyright law that we are
searching for. We saw the possible conceptual candidates that the
framers had. They could treat copyright law as a trade regulation, like
the Statute of Anne. They could treat it as a natural right, as did, to
some extent, some of the pre-constitutional state statutes. They had
two models for doing so: as a primary justification (Connecticut), or as
a supplement to another conception (Massachusetts). They also had a
different basis to anchor and justify copyright: as a tool to achieve a
public goal. This justification relied on the seeming paradox that the
pursuit of private interest results in public good. This is how the sys-
tem of copyright had worked in England until that day; this is what
the lobbyists' efforts taught the framers, and they had the support of
the recent economic theory of Adam Smith, published in 1776. The
framers also had a wide array of public interests they could think of: a
practical need for uniformity, a federalist agenda, an interest in show-
ing England that the new nation was culturally independent. And
there was another range of public goals, candidates for the justifica-
tion of copyright, best expressed in the Massachusetts statute: "the
184 See supra note 156.
185 For current articulations of these ideas of democracy, see Ronald Dworkin, Free
Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT
BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 63 (Joshua E. Rosenkrantz ed., 1999);
OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY .OF FREE SPEECH 3 (Cambridge, Mass., 1996) (collective
deliberation).
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improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the public
weal of the community, and the advancement of human happiness."'' 8 6
I think all four purposes should be read as synonymous or at least as
mutually supporting; each implies and reinforces the others. Improved
knowledge is a progress of civilization, which promotes the public
weal and results in advancement of human happiness (recall also the
Declaration of Independence's "pursuit of happiness"). We also saw
some more concrete content to these rather abstract goals: that copy-
right promotes knowledge, and knowledge is a guarantor of liberty.
We should also place this specific set of possible conceptions
against the historical background: it was a time of establishing a new
social instrument, the most important one. We should also recall the
intellectual background, which we have surveyed earlier, and recall its
tremendous influence upon the framers. Ideas of enlightenment, ra-
tionalism, Republicanism, Calvinism, political ideas derived from
Locke and Adam Smith, as well as the influence of the common law,
natural law, and a wide range of other political theories-all were in
the air. The idea of progress was one of those floating around.
The framers chose the basic structure of "private vice-public
good," and so eliminated the natural law tones. The act of constitu-
tionalization itself indicates the importance of the public goal, and
that the purpose of trade regulation was reduced to at most a secon-
dary consideration. It is quite implausible that a mere trade regulation
would have found its way into such a prominent document, especially
when trade was already covered by the Commerce Clause. 187 As for
the content of the "public good": the federalization of copyright itself
indicates acceptance of the need for uniformity. There is no mention
of the narrower political goals, of honor to the country and political
independence, but, in a sense, these goods are a by-product of the
entire constitutional project.
Out of all the possible options, the framers encapsulated the pub-
lic goal in one term: "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." With one phrase they shaped American copyright law for cen-
turies to come, and the shape was that of progress. We have seen the
main features of the idea of progress as it was understood at the time.
The copyright clause reflected all these features. The copyright sys-
tem, once rid of natural law tones, is not a mechanism to preserve the
past. It does not look backwards. Rather, it fixes its vision straight
ahead. The copyright is not an award based on a past event (creation
186 See supra note 145.
187 "The Congress shall have Power... to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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by author) but a tool to achieve a goal yet to come. Thus, the copy-
right system is sensitive to the temporal dimension and implicitly (but
clearly) rejects a cyclical view of human progress. The direction of the
progress is clear: it is for the better. The goals of improving knowl-
edge, the weal of the public, the advancement of human happiness,
and of course "Progress" all indicate that there is a better future lying
ahead.
The newly created system is devoid of any religious tones. Once
man can promote progress-and does so by creating a system de-
signed to achieve it-God or any other external force is cast out of the
picture. Man alone is responsible for the progress, and thus progress
can be promoted. This secularization goes hand in hand with eliminat-
ing remnants of a natural rights theory. The Lockean theory of natural
rights, which could easily explain copyright at the time, was religious
in its content.188 Locke's theory begins with the proposition that "'tis
very clear, that God, as King David says,.., has given the Earth to the
Children of Men, given it to Mankind in Common." 189 The Constitu-
tion as a whole does not refer to religious beliefs as a relevant source.
Compare it to the religious tone of the Declaration of Independence,
thirteen years earlier ("that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights . . .).190
Copyright law is part of the less religious Constitution. 191
We have seen that the idea of progress as such is a general idea,
capable of many particular kinds of content. Which is the one that the
Constitution reflects? Textually, it is "Science and useful Arts." Copy-
right has "knowledge" as its subject matter, and we have seen that it is
a term loaded with political meaning, not a mere equivalent to
"learning."
But progress, as a general idea, is also rather vague, and as such
does not guide us much in the daily application of copyright law. How-
ever, it can host other ideas which can provide the fine-tuning. In the
next section, I show how progress is a lively concept in contemporary
copyright law, that it can guide us directly, at least in some areas, and
that it comfortably hosts other theories.
188 1 say "at the time," for today it is implausible to think of unoccupied public domain
that can be ripped of its status, based on the Lockean theory.
189 Locke, supra note 13, at 288, § 25 (emphasis in original).
190 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
191 1 say "less," for obviously the religious beliefs of the framers were among the factors
that shaped their views, and thus are necessarily inserted into the Constitution, albeit indi-
rectly. For an argument about Calvinist influence, see Hamilton, supra note 98.
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III.
PROGRESS IN CONTEMPORARY COPYRIGHT LAW
The idea of progress has gone almost unnoticed by copyright law-
yers. Its importance in the eighteenth century makes a contemporary
neglect of the idea somewhat surprising. One might argue that pro-
gress is a dead idea.192 But I think the opposite is true. Progress is
overlooked not because it is dead, but because it has become an inte-
gral part of our thought. There might be lively debates as to whether
humankind has actually progressed. We still suffer from uncured ill-
nesses, there are "natural" disasters that we do not know how to cope
with, human-made wars are not a past phenomenon, and there are
many other wrongs to be corrected. But there seems to be a wide
agreement that technology has progressed. Copyright law, which regu-
lates aspects of progress, has absorbed the idea probably more than
any other social institution.
In this section my goal is, first, to show that the idea of progress
controls much of our thought about copyright law. The gist of the idea
of progress in contemporary copyright law resides in two metaphors:
that of dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants, and that of build-
ing. Second, I want to show that progress is a useful concept in the
operation of copyright law. It has a restraining role that protects us
against the self-interest of some parties, and it has a positive role in
constructing copyright doctrines. I will briefly discuss the fair use de-
fense and the idea/expression dichotomy in this connection.
A. Dwarfs, Giants, Building, and Progress
Two metaphors enjoy wide admiration in copyright law (and pat-
ent law), especially by commentators. The two are related, in that they
seem to convey the same idea. The first is the "dwarfs on giants'
shoulders" metaphor, or as it has become known, On The Shoulders
Of Giants, or simply OTSOG.193 The other is the notion of "build-
ing."1 94 A close examination reveals that these metaphors are invoked
quite randomly, in support of different arguments, to serve as authori-
ties for applying different doctrines in different ways. In this sense, the
metaphors are a tool in the hands of the author (whether a judge, a
litigant, or a scholar) to produce meanings while creating an impres-
192 See JAMES J. BERNARD, THE DEATH OF PROGRESS (1973).
193 ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT
(Chicago 1993).
194 A simple search in Westlaw produced 96 law review articles with one formulation of
the dwarfs metaphor. No doubt, there are many articles that are not posted in Westlaw,
and there are numerous other formulations of the metaphor.
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sion that the meanings are well established. 195 Whatever else the met-
aphors might contain, they embody the idea of progress. This is
progress in its general, rather abstract form. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Pa-
perback Software Int'1196 serves as an example for this kind of use of
the metaphor. The district court faced the metaphors, and noted that
the premise they reflect "has long been a virtually unchallenged pre-
mise" and "is also firmly established in our case law.' 97
Let us look into the metaphors and the way in which they convey
the idea of progress.
1. OTSOG
There is a subtle but fierce academic battle going on in copyright
law scholarship, and it all takes place in footnotes of law review arti-
cles.198 It is a search for the earliest source of the OTSOG metaphor,
and there could not be a better illustration for the metaphor than this
search itself. Let us then look at the unfolding of the sources of the
metaphor. We owe this tracing of the origins of the metaphor to Rob-
ert Merton's wonderful inquiry. He is the winner-for the time be-
ing-of the competition (and he is not a lawyer). 99
The best known formulation of OTSOG is attributed to Isaac
Newton, who wrote in 1675: "If I have seen further[,] it is by standing
on [th]e sho[u]lders of giants. '200 The physical constellation that the
metaphor compels us to imagine is at once majestic and mystifying.
Giants belong to an immortal and enchanting land of imagination. But
where are the dwarfs? George Herbert had them in the picture thirty
years before Newton: "A dwarf standing on a gyant's shoulder sees
further than the two."'20 ' So now we have the dwarfs as well. They
make the picture less scary. They add color and a figure we can iden-
tify with more easily. But where did Newton's first-person pronoun
come from? Seeking for the answer takes us 500 years before Herbert
195 The metaphor I just used contains the romantic view of the author: the author who
struggles over her work, sweats in its production (and "sweat" is another buzzword in
copyright law), and finally manages to produce, on her own, a work. There is much doubt
as to the extent this notion accurately reflects copyright law.
196 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that menu command structures of computer
programs and their presentation on the screen are copyrightable).
197 Id. at 77.
198 The unofficial declaration of the competition can be found in Chafee's use of the
metaphor, in the text of his article, without attribution to a source. See Chafee, supra note
7, at 511.
199 See Merton, supra note 193. See also MATEI CALINESCU, FACES OF MODERNITY 15-
16 (1977); Foster E. Guyer, The Dwarf on the Giant's Shoulder, 45 MODERN LANGUAGE
NOTES 398 (1930).
200 In a letter to Robert Hooke, February 5, 1675; Merton, supra note 193, at 8-9.
201 Merton, id. at 13.
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and Newton. John of Salisbury reported that his mentor, Bernard of
Chartres, wrote (or said) sometime before 1126 (the original book was
lost): "In comparison to the ancients, we stand like dwarfs on the
shoulders of giants. °202
We now have it all: here we are, today, only dwarfs, who on our
own behalf are only short-sighted, standing on the shoulders of crea-
tures of the past, who were far more far-sighted than we are. But by
standing on their shoulders, which is relying on the knowledge they
acquired, we can see even further ahead. Portraying ourselves, con-
temporaries, as dwarfs vis-A-vis the giants of the past might be under-
stood at first blush as modesty: They were great, we are not.2 03
Pointing to our reliance on the giants of the past is a way of apologiz-
ing for anything we do differently, for anything we dare to change.
Changing is not rebelling against the predecessors' authority. On the
contrary, relying on them is precisely what enables and allows us to
change. This explains why actors operating within strict systems of au-
thority invoke the metaphor. One such system is the legal one.204
Of course, we should not fall for this show of modesty. It is but a
nice way to disguise the novelty and rebellious nature of the devia-
tions from the authority. This is no surprise to common law lawyers.
We are trained to read judicial opinions with skeptical eyes, searching
for the deviations from binding precedents that are not defined explic-
itly. Distinguishing a case, limiting it to its facts, and other common
techniques are subtle manipulations. When faced with the direct accu-
sation of not following binding precedents, courts invoke, inter alia,
the OTSOG metaphor. They admit the deviation but at the same time
202 Merton, id. at 40, 177.
203 Guyer argues that this was the main use of the metaphor prior to the "battle of the
moderns and the ancients." He consents, however, that the element of priority was not
absent either. See supra note 199, at 399.
204 This is not exclusive to the common law system. We thus find a prominent Jewish
Italian thinker in the early thirteenth century writing, regarding the power of precedent in
Jewish Law:
"I heard from the philosophers[: they] asked the greatest among them [the
following: ']we admit that the former [scholars] were smarter and more edu-
cated than we are[,] and we admit that we talk about them and contradict their
sayings in many places and the truth is among us[.] [H]ow is this possible[?'],
and he told them[: ']who sees further[:] the dwarf or the giant[,] i.e., the giant
whose eyes are fixed higher than the dwarf, and if you seat the dwarf on the
shoulders of the giant, who sees further[?,] i.e., the dwarf, whose eyes are now
higher than those of the giant's, so are we dwarfs, hanging onto the giant's
shoulders[,] and because we saw their wisdom, and add to it from their wisdom
we [derived our own] wisdom to say all that we do, and it is not that we are
greater than them .... [']"
YISHA'YA DETRANI, TsHUVOT HARY"D, 75 (Abrham Y. M. Vertheimer ed., Jerusalem
1975) (my translation).
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refuse to dismiss the authorities, and turn to "new facts," or some
other change.205
In common law as in copyright law, OTSOG serves as a reminder
of the idea of progress. Legal systems are binding and authoritative.
Systems of knowledge do not have (in most cases) such formal power.
But both systems reflect the idea of progress. It is the feature of cumu-
lative, gradual change over time, aiming at what the actors hope is the
better. Those who first invoked the idea of progress in post-Renais-
sance Europe, or at least revived it,2°6 faced a problem similar to the
one that faces jurists in a common law system. This is the famous
"Battle of the Ancients against the Moderns," which took place in
France and England in the seventeenth century. 20 7 It was a debate on
authority: Who has the final say? The ancients had one obvious ad-
vantage: they were first in thinking, writing, inventing, and creating.
They also enjoy the glamour of antiquity. Being first seems to be a
knockout. But the moderns can rely on their predecessors' work, and
devote time and effort to further thought. If so, the moderns can reach
greater achievements than the ancients did (and indeed, the moderns
thought so). They were able to correct the ancients' mistakes and
claim moral superiority (and any other kind of superiority). 2 8 That
too looks like a knockout. 20 9 So who wins the battle? The idea of pro-
gress resolves the problem, using the OTSOG metaphor. It ties the
moderns' success in overcoming the ancients to the ancients them-
205 See for example Justice O'Connor's struggle to explain the deviation from Roe v.
Wade in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
and her conclusion that "[t]o overrule prior law for no other reason than that [current
views, while no change in facts or the understanding of facts] would run counter to the
view repeated in our cases, that a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason
over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided." Notice, once again, that
the rule of overruling is itself the product of precedents.
206 See the debate as to the origins of the idea, Mathiopoulos, supra note 27.
207 See Bury, supra note 28; Spadafora, supra note 30, at 22; Nisbet, supra note 4, at 151-
156. Jonathan Swift, who gained fame with Gulliver's Travels (now that's a story about
giants and dwarfs!) published in 1704 the "Full and true account of the battle fought last
Friday between the ancient and the modern books in Saint James's library," which can be
found in A TALE OF A TUB (Oxford, 2d ed., 1973). In discussing copyright, it is impossible
not to mention that Swift was himself accused of copying the book from French sources.
See the introduction by A. C. Guthkech and D. Nichol Smith, id. at xlix-l. But, later on,
Swift was directly involved in lobbying for authors' rights (vis-t-vis publishers) when a
copyright bill was discussed in 1737, in Parliament. See Donald Cornu, Swift, Motte, and the
Copyright Struggle: Two Unnoticed Documents, 54 MODERN LANGUAGE NoTEs, 114
(1939).
208 Calinescu, supra note 199, at 26-35.
209 Dwarfs, I am informed by the Oxford dictionary, are "small beings with magic pow-
ers." I did not find any place where the OTSOG metaphor mentioned the magical power,
but it might be implicit in our thought. This power, after all, is how dwarfs manage to
overcome the might of the giants.
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selves, so both sides win. Knowledge is a joint venture of past, present,
and future generations of creators. The battle and its peaceful resolu-
tion are embodied in the metaphor, and, thus, the idea of progress is
carried by it. The frequent application of the metaphor in copyright
law reflects the pervasiveness of the idea in copyright law and rein-
forces it. We should note, too, that there is no divinity in the giants-
and-dwarfs picture.
2. Building
The building metaphor is not as vivid as the OTSOG one, but it is
powerful nevertheless. 210 It is the notion that a second author builds
upon the work of the first author (or inventor, for that matter).
Intellectual (and artistic) progress is possible only if each author
builds on the works of others. No one invents even a tiny fraction of
the ideas that make up our cultural heritage .... Every work uses
scraps of thought from thousands of predecessors .... 211
And "[c]opyright law has always recognized and tried to accommo-
date the fact that all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their
predecessors. '12 12 The same idea is also conveyed without the direct
appeal to building. An 1845 decision explained:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and
original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, bor-
rows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before. 213
There are numerous references to this notion.214 The building
metaphor, like its companion OTSOG, reflects the idea of progress. It
210 Architecture offered itself as a metaphor in legal thought a long time ago. Oliver W.
Holmes wrote over a century ago that "Theory is the most important part of the dogma of
the law, as the architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a
house," The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897). Spatial metaphors are quite
common in discussions of computers ("desktop," "windows," "drag," "open," "close," etc).
See STEVEN JOHNSON, INTERFACE CULTURE (New York, 1997). Not surprisingly, designing
the law of the Internet is often described through the metaphor of architecture. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (New York, 1999).
211 Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.).
212 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
213 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C. D. Mass. 1845).
214 For a few examples in modern cases, see Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Ser-
vice Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F. 2d 972,
980 (2d Cir. 1980); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 940 (2d Cir. 1994)
(Jacobs, J., dissenting); White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) (denial of
rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The metaphor is pervasive among commentators as
well. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
135 (1998).
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portrays intellectual work as a process of gradual, cumulative change
over time. The building metaphor is more neutral in its characteriza-
tion than OTSOG. All authors, former and contemporary, are por-
trayed in an equal setting, except for the different times in which they
operate. There are no giants and dwarfs. So second authors cannot
pretend to be modest, and former ones do not enjoy an ex ante re-
spect. The building notion gets rid of another feature of the OTSOG
metaphor. The latter sees the world in two modes only: now and then.
There are only contemporary dwarfs and past giants. The building
metaphor, in this sense, is richer. Every author just lays a brick (or
perhaps a few bricks). Seeing the human enterprise through the build-
ing metaphor reminds us that time is not static. The builder of yester-
day did not begin from zero either. She too laid her bricks on already
existing ones. The current author too lays his bricks, but these will
serve as a basis for future builders. The OTSOG metaphor fails to
convey the understanding that she who is the dwarf today might be-
come the giant tomorrow.
Earlier I asked, What progress do we want so much to promote?
We can now paraphrase: What exactly is it that we are building? The
repetitive use of the building metaphor fails to ask this question. But if
we do not pay attention to what it is that we are doing, we might end
up, not with a Taj Mahal, but with a Tower of Babel or a Berlin Wall.
Towers, we now know, might collapse, and walls restrain freedom.
In sum, the pervasiveness of these two metaphors in copyright
law and our thought about it makes them the most obvious ambassa-
dors of the idea of progress in the land of contemporary copyright
law. They convey all the major characteristics of the idea: the advance-
ment, over time, toward a better condition, where the advancement is
slow, gradual, and cumulative, directed by man and not God.
B. Progress in Operation
On its own, the idea of progress is a general idea. A skeptical
reaction might be that the idea is simply empty, that it does not say
much, and does not inform us how to operate. 215 Think of the two
metaphors we just examined. They are more likely to be invoked by
defendants in copyright cases than by plaintiffs. The modesty that the
OTSOG metaphor communicates, when uttered by a dwarf who is a
later author, classifies the use of the metaphor as a defense argument.
215 Umberto Eco is perhaps more generous in his attitude to the OTSOG aphorism,
when he suggests that the debate should concentrate not on the meaning of the aphorism
itself (thus, implying that there is such a meaning), but rather on the meaning in various
contexts. See his introduction to Merton, supra note 193, at xv.
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One commentator, writing for the Practicing Law Institute, mentioned
OTSOG as the first strategy for defendants in fair use cases.216 Put in
OTSOGean, 217 we would say that we would like to ensure free access
to the giants' shoulders to as many dwarfs as possible, to enable all of
us to see further ahead. This would imply minimal protection for pre-
vious authors. Or in the terms of the building metaphor, when we look
at it from the point of view of the second author, we would conclude
that bricks should be as accessible and available as possible, to enable
further building.
But plaintiffs can put their spin on these stories quite easily. The
metaphors are flexible and elusive enough to allow this. Think of it
from the point of view of the first author, the plaintiff. We would like
to assure that she will engage in the project of building in the first
place, or, in OTSOGean, we would like to make sure she will bother
to climb on the high shoulders of some giants, not an easy task. To do
so, we should guarantee her enough protection.
Judge Easterbrook addressed both these possible views:
Once a work has been written and published, any rule requiring
people to compensate the authors slows progress in literature and
art, making useful expressions "too expensive," forcing authors to
re-invent the wheel, and so on.218
This is the second author's claim. The first author's claim is that
to deny authors all reward for the value their labors contribute to
the works of others also will lead to inefficiently little writing, just as
surely as excessively broad rights will do. The prospect of reward is
an important stimulus for thinking and writing .... Before the first
work is published, broad protection of intellectual property seems
best; after it is published, narrow protection seems best. At each
instant some new works are in progress, and every author is simulta-
neously a creator in part and a borrower in part. In these roles the
person has different objectives. Yet only one rule can be in force. 219
In this sub-section I would like to counter the skeptical view that
the idea of progress is empty, and show that the idea is helpful in at
least two ways. One is that it serves as a warning against the infiltra-
tion of improper conceptions into copyright law-namely, against a
216 Richard Lehv, Fair Use Strategies, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (Practicing Law Institute, Nov. & Dec.,
1997) 497 PLI/P at 403.
217 Merton offers a whole dictionary based on OTSOG. See supra note 193, at 275.
218 Nash, supra note 211.
219 Id.
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proprietary conception.220 Another way is that progress has an active
role in designing copyright doctrines.
1. Progress as a Constraint
The idea of progress can serve as a powerful reminder of the con-
stitutional principle of copyright law.221 It is a forward-looking ideal.
The past has no importance per se and is relevant only in as much as it
is part of the tools copyright law applies. The forward-looking position
of the idea of progress thus serves as an additional reason for rejecting
the proprietary conception of copyright law. The latter conception is
the argument that copyright law is just a case of property, when un-
derstood against the background of a natural rights theory or a strong
libertarian view. A proprietary view looks to the past, and to the past
only. It decides the entitlement based on some event or events that
took place in the past. This could be an act of investing labor, or an act
of embodiment of one's personality in a physical object.22 2 Under a
proprietary conception, any goal of the law is simply irrelevant. The
temporal feature of the idea of progress reminds us that there is a
continuum.
The idea of progress also conveys a message about the way
knowledge is created. The proprietary view and the economic analysis
of copyright law (which operates within the regulatory conception of
copyright law but emphasizes the legal instrument rather than the
goal) focus on the first stage, creation.22 3 They insulate that stage from
those that follow. They do not ask how knowledge is disseminated and
used. The idea of progress reminds us that knowledge is created by
many participants along the march of time. It is a cumulative process,
and the advancement is gradual. Thus, understanding copyright law
through the lenses of progress should remind us of this process. In-
stead of focusing on the creation of the "original" work by the first
author, we should remember that the plaintiff is not necessarily the
first author. She almost certainly has built on the work of her prede-
cessors, as they did before her. The plaintiff is not the first link in the
chain, but rather she is somewhere along it.
220 For the distinction between a "regulatory" conception of copyright law and a "pro-
prietary" conception thereof, see Patterson and Lindberg, supra note 15.
221 For a similar use of the idea of progress as a constraint, though with different empha-
sis, see Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 535 (2000).
222 According to the theories of Locke and Hegel, respectively.
223 See Landes & Posner, supra note 23.
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This view reminds us of the importance of maintaining a public
domain.224 If we put thorns on the shoulders of the giants, no dwarf
will be able to stand there and see further. If we do not allow new
builders to place new bricks on the already existing ones, the whole
project of the building will be slowed. Of course, the idea of progress
encompasses the need to reward authors for their creations. The gi-
ants will be provided with protection, so they have an incentive to
look far ahead. The builders will be provided with sufficient incentive
so they lay their bricks in the first place. But progress reminds us that
the bricks are there for a reason. They are part of our common
building.
Margaret Chon complains that courts feel that progress is rele-
vant only when they recognize an enforceable right. She writes that
when courts find a particular slice of knowledge is not covered by a
copyright or patent, their opinions seem unable to name the "Pro-
gress" project. The denial of property rights in knowledge is often
accompanied by a rhetorical omission, as if it is almost counterintui-
tive to suggest that "Progress" of knowledge is furthered by a find-
ing of no copyright or patent right.225
She adds that "all of us who think and write about intellectual prop-
erty are coping with an omission: the missing project of 'Progress.'- 226
Progress can help us in coping with intellectual property, and in a
manner that reinforces our commitment to the regulatory conception
of copyright law and, within it, to the view that does not forget the use
of the protected works.
2. Progress as a Guiding Principle: Fair Use
The idea of progress can play a more active role in designing
copyright law. This role is especially apparent in the important doc-
trine of the fair use defense. The defense allows non-owners to use the
expression of a copyrighted work in their work, but only as long as the
user satisfies the four factors enumerated in § 107 of the Copyright
Act.227 In what follows, I briefly show how progress can inform us in
articulating the fair use defense.
224 The traditional definition of the public domain includes all the elements which are
not copyrightable, like ideas, facts, works whose copyright protection has lapsed, etc. See
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965 (1990). Yochai Benkler includes
also elements that are copyrightable, but whose use is allowed due to an exception or
defense, like fair use. See also Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Con-
straints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999).
225 Chon, supra note 4, at 104. See also at 110.
226 Id. at 113.
227 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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Most of the scholarly writing about the fair use defense tries to
determine its scope and to instruct us as to its best application. But,
surprisingly, there is little written about its justifications.2 28 The vari-
ous Senate and House Reports that accompanied the revision bills
that culminated in the 1976 Act simply stated that the codification of
the defense "is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine," re-
peated over and over again that the doctrine should remain flexible, 22 9
and endorsed "the purpose and general scope of the judicial doc-
trine." The defense's purpose is hardly discussed. It remains as-
sumed. 230 Judicial engagement with the defense was only somewhat
more generous in its discussion, and addressed the underlying justifi-
cations of the defense only in passing. 231 The lack of discussion is sur-
prising, for one would expect that a 150-year-long (if not longer)
debate, sometimes a heated one, 232 would seek guidance in the under-
lying principles of the debated subject. This, however, is rarely done.
Without a clear vision of why exactly we have the doctrine, there
should be little wonder that its content is so much debated. In the
sporadic discussion that does address this issue we can identify two
main justifications. One explains the doctrine in light of general goals
of copyright law, against the background of an economic analysis. A
second justification is based on a legal fiction borrowed from the law
of contracts: the doctrine of implied consent.
The fair use doctrine is often justified as serving the same goals as
those of copyright law in general.233 This is a general justification, for
it tells us that the defense serves the general goals of copyright law.
228 There are some notable exceptions. See, for example, William W. Fisher, Recon-
structing the Fair Use Defense, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use
as a Market Failure: A Structural and Economical Analysis of the Betamax Case and its
Predecessors, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
229 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 2237, 89th Congress, 2d Sess. 58 (1966).
230 An exception is Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Material-Study No. 14 (1958),
86th Cong. 2d Sess. (1960).
231 It has been said that Justice Story, in his important decision in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839), "failed to articulate the purpose of his inquiry." See Harvey
S. Perlman & Laurens H. Rhinelander, Williams & Willkins Co. v. United States: Photo-
copying, Copyright, and the Judicial Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 355, 381.
232 See the debate about the scope of fair use in the digital environment that took place
in a special forum, initiated by the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, which
was one of the branches of the Information Infrastructure Taskforce (IITF) formed by
President Clinton in 1993. See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, THE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE-FINAL
REPORT (Washington, D.C., 1998) (CONFU Report).
233 See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corporation, 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1529-
1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The copyright law, through the fair use doctrine, has promoted the
goal of encouraging creative expression and integrity by ensuring that those who produce
intellectual works may benefit from them.") See also Perlman and Rhinelander, supra note
231, at 380 (describing fair use as balancing "the proprietary rights of author against the
public interested in access to information").
PROGRESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
This can be described negatively as a check within the copyright ma-
chine (or engine): "[The defense] permits courts to avoid rigid appli-
cation of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the
very creativity which the law is designed to foster. '234
Not stifling creativity is one feature of the general justification.
This rationale assumes (correctly) that copyright law's purpose is to
foster creativity. In some articulations of this rationale, the "not sti-
fling creativity" element is omitted, and thus the defense is portrayed
as a positive mechanism. In this version, the justification simply re-
peats the purpose of copyright law: "The fundamental justification for
the privilege lies in the constitutional purpose in granting copyright
protection in the first instance, to wit, 'To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.'- 235 The same reasoning has been adopted at
the district level.2 36 These negative and positive articulations are two
sides of the same coin. Thus, fair use is an integral part of promoting
creativity and assuring that it is not stifled. But in fact this rationale
does not say much more than that.237 It needs an injection of sub-
stance to become meaningful.
One such injection comes from the economic analysis of copy-
right law. Under this view, the market for copyrighted works might
suffer some failures. The economic analysis detects these situations
and attempts to correct them.238 Fair use, under this rationale, is such
an attempt. In a seminal work, Professor Wendy Gordon argued that
"fair use should be interpreted as a mode of judicial response to mar-
ket failure. '239 She points out instances of such failures. High transac-
tion costs are one of these situations. When, because of various costs,
a transaction does not take place, the defense should allow the trans-
action to be executed, the price for the use being zero. We can include
under this heading all costs of facilitating a transaction: initiating con-
234 Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Com-
pany, Inc., 621 F. 2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980), adopted by the Supreme Court in Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1989); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 596, 577
(1994).
235 Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1996).
236 Love v. Kwitny, 706 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS
AND INFORMATION 54 (Washington, D.C., 1986) (noting that fair use "has the express pur-
pose of fostering the values of the cultural and political realms").
237 See Henry S. Hoberman, Copyright and the First Amendment. Freedom or Monopoly
of Expression?, 14 PEPP. L. REv. 571, 580-581 (1987) (The justification of fair use as pro-
moting the progress of science provides little guidance.).
238 The compulsory license scheme is an example of an attempt to correct a perceived
market failure. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (secondary transmission by cable television); § 115
(making and distributing phonorecords).
239 Gordon, supra note 228, at 1605.
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tact with the user, negotiating the transaction and, if necessary, en-
forcing it.24 ° A single author does not have the resources-
information, time, and money-to take any of these steps. This is so of
most intellectual works: literary works, music, works of fine art, com-
puter software-especially when the use is widely dispersed. Once a
musician records her work and distributes it (assuming she keeps the
rights), she cannot possibly know of any unauthorized copying or use
in any college dormitory, in a New Orleans club, in an East Village
bar, on a local radio station in Nebraska, let alone in similar places in
Lisbon, Sidney, Beijing, Tel Aviv, or Buenos Aires, so she is unable to
initiate negotiations. And even if she knew, our musician lacks the
resources to do much about it. And even if she were a person of
means, it would not be practical to do much: the cost of the transac-
tion would dramatically exceed the expected revenue. From the
owner's point of view, then, transaction costs affect the enforceability
of the right.
But today we have legal as well as technological solutions to mar-
ket failure of this kind. Technology, especially in digital works, makes
it possible to block access to "unauthorized" use. The law now pro-
vides an additional layer of protection to the copyrighted works (and
to uncopyrighted ones as well) in the form of a prohibition of circum-
vention of these technological devices.241 In addition, contracts can be
used as a legal mechanism to stop the leaking of unauthorized use. 242
The problem with these new legal and technological tools is that they
enable owners of copyrighted works to block access and use of works
that are in the public domain, as well as some unprotected elements of
their works, like the ideas and facts that they embody. If we put all the
justificational eggs of the fair use defense in the market basket, we are
likely to pay an unintended and high price in terms of free speech
concerns and in terms of progress as well.
The second justification that is mentioned to explain the exis-
tence of the fair use defense is founded on the legal fiction of implied
consent. 243 This version of the justification searches for the consent in
a particular case. This reasoning may permit fair use in certain circum-
stances, but these circumstances turn out to be quite narrow. The con-
240 For Gordon's articulation of this problem see id. at 1628. See also Landes & Posner,
supra note 23, at 357-358 (1989).
241 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
242 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). For a critical analysis,
see Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L. J. 93 (1997).
243 Latman notes that this rationale is "frequently fictitious." See Latman, supra note
230, at 31. See also 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05.
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tractual configuration is a legal fiction that is limited by its own
definition: when the consent cannot be inferred, it will not be availa-
ble.244 A more sophisticated version of this justification is that the
consent is part of a "bargain" between the public and the author: the
author agrees, at the time that she requests legal protection, to allow
"fair" use. 245 We could describe this in yet another way. Authors, be-
hind a veil of ignorance, would agree to some use of copyrighted
works, for they know that their own creative work necessarily builds
on the already existing work of others. Not knowing their future posi-
tion, they would agree to allow limited use.246 This version in fact ech-
oes the progress justification, which I shall discuss shortly. Economic
analysis might also explain this willingness to allow limited use.
Landes and Posner, for example, explain why publishers are better off
if they allow book reviews. The case for good reviews is obvious, but
Landes and Posner explain that publishers, as a group, are better off,
ex ante, allowing all reviews, good or bad, since without fair use, pub-
lishers would have control over reviews, and the reviews would lose
their credibility. 247 Such explanations might provide reasonable an-
swers in some situations, like book reviews, but they cannot explain
why copyright owners would agree, ex ante, to uses, like parodies and
satires, that are far less likely to leave them better off.
These justifications might explain certain aspects of the fair use
defense, but each on its own is rather limited in its instruction. The
idea of progress offers a stronger justification for the defense. It over-
arches the ones just discussed, and eliminates their internal limita-
tions. The progress justification ties the fair use defense to the abstract
goals of copyright law and adds the spin of the idea of progress. When
the creative process is understood as a cumulative, ongoing building
project, it is obvious that copyright law should facilitate and enable
this process and remove any obstacles in its way. Access to existing
work is a necessity. Access is required to enrich the future builders, so
that they will not have to reinvent the wheel. It is also required as the
raw material for the new knowledge. A brick in the wall stands on
other bricks, and cannot be placed in thin air. Complete ownership
over knowledge will prevent new builders from joining the project.
244 Latman notes that this rationale fails as an overall basis of the defense. See Latman,
supra note 230, at 7, 31. For an example of such a failure, see Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett
Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938). (A tobacco advertisement quoted
a physician's book about the human voice. The court refused to find the use fair, explaining
that "it cannot be implied that Dr. Felderman consented to the use of his work for such a
purpose.")
245 For this version see Latman, supra note 230, at 7.
246 The "veil of ignorance" is of course borrowed from John Rawls.
247 See Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 359.
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Not being able to lay their bricks on the existing bricks, they will not
be able to contribute to the project of knowledge. This would obstruct
the building, and thus stifle the process of creation. The fair use de-
fense reflects the understanding that, in some circumstances, access to
and use of expression, not only of ideas, is required for the continuous
building. The following comment of the Sixth Circuit is typical: "[F]air
use ... [is] based upon the principle that subsequent workers in the
same field are not deprived of all use thereof, as, otherwise, the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts would be unduly obstructed. '2 48
This explanation of the defense is apparent also in the Latman Study,
which was adopted as the official legislative history of the defense. 249
Professor Latman pointed to the need for a "certain degree of lati-
tude" in the use of copyrighted material for the sake of "progress of
science and useful arts," based on the necessary "step-by-step"
progress. 250
A direct consequence of the progress justification is the require-
ment that the purported fair use should be "productive," or as Judge
Pierre Leval reformulated it, "transformative. '' 251 If the second use
does not add some value to the first, and is only duplicative, no new
brick has been added to the building. The building project is not inter-
ested in more bricks of the same kind, but rather in new bricks. The
building is vertical, not horizontal. This preference is the difference
between quantity and quality. The idea of progress is interested in the
latter, and is indifferent to the former, at least as long as it does not
disturb the qualitative dimension.
The law, in the role of supervising the building project, should
also make sure that the builders are motivated to lay any blocks in the
first place. This is the familiar incentive aspect of copyright law. Had I
known that someone would reproduce "my" block without adding any
value to it, and without my permission, I would have thought twice
about placing it to begin with.252 The law assures me that this will not
happen. So, according to this line of thought, subsequent use will en-
joy the fair use defense only if it adds new value to the already ex-
isting work. The added value is the progress.
248 Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
249 Latman, supra note 230.
250 Id. at 7 (introducing the rationale); 30-31 (emphasizing the "practical necessity" of a
step-by-step progress). See also Leon R. Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV.
203, 214 (1954) (weaving all justification into one); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use and How it
Got That Way, 45 J. COPYR. Soc'Y. 634, 638-39 (1998) (discussing the justification through
the nineteenth-century treatise of Eaton Drone).
251 See Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
252 In other words, a non-transformative use causes authors greater harm than a trans-
formative use. See Landes & Posner, supra note 23.
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3. Progress as a Guiding Principle: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Copyright law protects only expressions and prohibits protecting
ideas. The dichotomy is now codified in the Copyright Act.253 The
statutory definition, which excludes ideas from the scope of coverage
of copyright law, is based on the strong intuition that ideas should be
free. Perhaps because of this intuition and its self-evidentiary power,
there is little writing about the rationale for the dichotomy.
The dichotomy is one of the cornerstones of copyright law. It was
established over a hundred years ago, in the case of Baker v. Sel-
den.254 The Court explained:
The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is
to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it con-
tains. But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not
be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book. 255
The Court identified the communication of knowledge as the purpose
of copyright law, and from this goal it deduced the limitation of copy-
right's subject matter. It should cover only the expression of ideas and
leave the ideas themselves free, with no tags of ownership attached.
Baker thus emphasized the communication of knowledge, its trans-
mission from its creator to its user. This explanation appeals to our
intuition that ideas are the essence of knowledge, and hence, if knowl-
edge is valued, ideas should remain beyond the reach of copyright law.
The dichotomy has a second justification, which is best expressed
in Justice Brandeis' words: that knowledge and ideas are "free as the
air to common use. ' 256 This can be read either as a description of the
impossibility and impracticality of controlling ideas, or as a normative
judgment, or as both. The description relates to the (meta)physical
feature of ideas as a public good. Ideas are non-excludable and non-
rivalrous. It is impossible to exclude unauthorized uses of ideas, and
each use does not diminish the value of the idea. The normative judg-
ment derives from the communication rationale of the dichotomy, and
from the progress rationale. We want ideas to remain free, for we
value their importance in the creation of knowledge.2 57 If we pause to
query why we value knowledge so much, we are likely to come up
253 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
254 Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
255 Id. at 103.
256 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). See also Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899) ("The right thus secured by
the copyright act is not a right to the use of certain words, because they are the common
property of the human race, and are as little susceptible of private appropriation as air or
sunlight ... ").
257 For a normative reading of this rationale, see Benkler, supra note 224.
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with democratic values. Knowledge is also valued per se, but it is the
engine of an informed polity, which governs itself through a collective
deliberation. In this sense, knowledge is the nerve system of our de-
mocracy. It connects the various organs into one whole, and is crucial
for their best functioning.
Another rationale, close to the Baker one, accepts the basic intui-
tion, but wishes to anchor itself in a broader theoretical framework of
knowledge. This is the project of the idea of progress. It is a project of
cumulative building of knowledge over time. The relevance to the
idea/expression dichotomy is obvious: each contributor to progress
necessarily relies on knowledge achieved by predecessors. Had ideas
been protected, everyone would have had to start from zero.258 This
would be counterproductive and costly.25 9
An articulate statement of this view is Judge Jon Newman's:
It is a fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster creativ-
ity. However, that law has the capacity both to augment and dimin-
ish the prospects for creativity. By assuring the author of an original
work the exclusive benefits of whatever commercial success his or
her work enjoys, the law obviously promotes creativity. At the same
time, it can deter the creation of new works if authors are fearful
that their creations will too readily be found to be substantially simi-
lar to preexisting works. The idea-expression dichotomy . . . is an
effort to enable courts to adjust the tension between these compet-
ing effects of copyright protection.260
The dichotomy, then, finds a solid theoretical base in our understand-
ing of the knowledge process. This, in turn, is best understood in the
framework of the idea of progress.
CONCLUSION
This paper has been a thought experiment, and has offered an
old, yet new, way to think of copyright law. I suggest that we look at
copyright law as a legal space that addresses the knowledge process:
the creation, dissemination, and use of knowledge. From this assump-
tion, we can infer that copyright law holds a view of the process it
regulates. It must have a conception of how knowledge is created, oth-
erwise it is meaningless. There has been one major attempt to explain
258 For a different expression of this idea, see 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03[B][2][a].
259 See Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 347-48 (arguing that legal protection for
ideas would increase the cost of creation and reduce the number of works created). Landes
and Posner also argue that while copyright protection for ideas will accelerate the develop-
ment of new ideas, it will reduce their dissemination. Id. at 349.
260 Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Companies, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
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this conception, the authorship project. According to that project,
copyright law is obsessed with a vision of a romantic author. The au-
thorship project can claim only partial success as a description, for
there are forms of collaborative authorship that the law acknowl-
edges, which the project cannot explain. Nor can the authorship pro-
ject explain the minor place of moral rights in the United States.
I offered the progress project instead-that we understand copy-
right law as a reflection of the idea of progress. This is the view that
knowledge is created in a gradual, step-by-step process over time, by
many participants. The knowledge is not just accumulated, but it
moves humankind toward a better future, in which the sky is the limit.
I then made a double claim-that the idea has shaped American copy-
right law, and that it still enjoys a dominant position in contemporary
copyright law. The first claim is historical in nature. I took a snapshot
of the idea of progress at the end of the eighteenth century. I then
traced the adoption and adaptation of copyright law into the Ameri-
can system. We saw that the idea of progress was injected into copy-
right law at that point. The English conception of copyright law at the
time was one of trade regulation. The American conception injected a
political dimension, which found its inspiration and substance in the
idea of progress. Furthermore, we saw that the idea of progress had a
political content. It was closely affiliated with political ideals about
knowledge and government.261
We then switched to the present and took another snapshot. The
idea of progress is still alive in copyright law, although it is not
presented as such. The idea is carried by two ubiquitous metaphors:
that of dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants, and that of build-
ing. We studied these metaphors to see how the idea of progress is
carried.
The progress project is not just a historical or purely intellectual
endeavor. It can be a helpful guide. We noted that the idea reinforces
the regulatory conception of copyright law and rejects a proprietary
view. It thus serves as a conceptual check. We further noted that the
idea explains the importance of the public domain and its mainte-
nance. It can also assist in shaping particular doctrines of copyright
law.
The progress project describes copyright law better than the au-
thorship project, and it is a more attractive picture. Unlike the latter,
the progress project has room to host non-singular creators. Collabo-
rative authorship fits within it easily, as well as tribal folklore and
other creative processes. Unlike the authorship project, which is fixed
261 This political dimension is what distinguishes "progress" from "innovation."
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on the moment in which a work was created, the progress project
views the creation as a first step in a dynamic process. It also has the
benefit of being a prescription that fits comfortably within the consti-
tutional framework. Other theories can also fit within it. A balanced
economic analysis can fit within the progress project, in which case
progress serves as a check on the economic analysis.
Progress is a modernist concept. It is deeply connected to the En-
lightenment. It might indeed be the case that today we live in a post-
modernist condition. We are in the midst of a battle between the
Moderns and the Post-moderns, and we-the public-are caught in
between. It is a fierce battle, and those who enjoy a prominent posi-
tion under the current copyright regime strive to maintain it in its
modernist spirit.262 The idea of progress, because of its commitment to
knowledge, can serve as a powerful force in assuring that whoever
wins this battle, the public is not hurt.
262 See ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (New York, 1999).
